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**INDIGENOUS COMPETITION FOR CONTROL IN  
BOLIVIA**

by

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**INDIGENOUS COMPETITION FOR CONTROL IN BOLIVIA**

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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the  
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## **ABSTRACT**

Bolivia's indigenous groups achieved an unprecedented level of political power in the latter half of the twentieth century. Traditional explanations for this phenomenon (elite alliances, deprivation, matter-of-time) have proven insufficient. This thesis argues that the ascendancy of Bolivia's groups can be best understood through the application of organization and social movement theories, and it uses the political economy framework as a backdrop. Data are drawn from scholarly analyses, official documents and historical texts. This thesis concludes that Bolivia's indigenous movement is not a single movement, but a coalition of many social movements. It demonstrates that ethnicity frameworks have in some cases hindered the progress of movements because of different understandings of ethnicity. Variegated interests, visions of the future, and geography, have exacerbated these differences. This thesis concludes with recommendations for strategic level policy-makers and tactical level operators.

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## I. INTRODUCTION

### A. BACKGROUND

The histories of indigenous populations in Latin America have long been wrought with themes of oppression, exploitation and exclusion. These themes have endured for these populations, whether at the hand of the Aztec or Incan empires, the Spanish or the North Americans. Despite this, the ethnic populations in Peru, Ecuador and Bolivia have played a role in shaping the future of each state, mostly as a buttress for elite opposition groups seeking power. What is significant is that over the past twenty-five years, indigenous movements along the Andean Ridge have begun to shape the state in ways more attuned to their own interests. What is puzzling is how recently these events in Bolivia have occurred given that roughly two-thirds of its population is composed of ethnic peoples and has been so for many years.

This thesis attempts to explain this recent phenomenon by looking specifically at the ascendancy of indigenous groups in Bolivia. Foremost, it attempts to determine how the structure of Bolivia's indigenous groups has affected their power, i.e., their ability to oppose or leverage the state. Secondary questions assess the effects of inherent structure, domestic and foreign actors, technology and geography on the strength of indigenous movements.

This chapter presents the significance of studying structure, and is followed by the hypothesis that explains indigenous power. The methodology section provides the analytical framework and identifies the actors involved in the study. Following the section on data sources, a roadmap is provided that outlines the study. Chapter one concludes with a brief description of indigenous societies, their structures, and a physical description of "Bolivia" prior to the arrival of the Spanish in 1532. This provides the foundation upon which this thesis is built.

### B. RELEVANCE

Why study the power mechanisms of indigenous groups? In places such as Afghanistan, Iraq, the Philippines and the like, the United States has come to relearn that it is not the armies that are the centers of gravity, but in fact, it is overwhelmingly the

indigenous population.<sup>1</sup> Simply put, it is helpful to study indigenous power mechanisms because these groups are gaining political significance in environments where US foreign policy emphasis is normally directed towards traditional state/elite actors, and social and developmental programs for the population are of only secondary importance. As indigenous groups begin to gain access to the levers of power, it is imperative that US policy take into account their interests, and that the US craft its policy in such a way that takes advantage of indigenous interests in order to maximize its potential for success.

US foreign policy towards the region has been a combination of successes and failures. Recent US interest in Bolivia has focused on curtailing the illicit coca trade. To that end, the US made its greatest strides during the 1990s as Bolivia's estimated coca cultivation was reduced from an estimated 240 metric tons (MT) annually to just less than 60 MT at its lowest point in 2001.<sup>2</sup> Eradication and interdiction efforts were reinforced with aid and development programs that focused on alternative crop cultivation, education, and judicial and law enforcement reform. However, as US attention began to focus on Colombia, and ultimately the Global War on Terror following the turn of the century, Bolivia immediately began a social and economic backslide. While the US was not directly responsible for the ouster of President "Goni" Sanchez de Lozada in 2003, its lacking and misplaced attention overlooked one of the new centers of gravity in Bolivian politics: indigenous movements. Goni's requests to the US for economic assistance during a time of fiscal frugality were denied, making it even harder for him to consolidate economic gains thus far and to alleviate opposition from below.

Among the Andean nations, why use Bolivia as a case study? First and foremost, it is the one location where indigenous movements have gained significant traction, and where their dependency on elites has diminished substantially. Colombia was ruled out because the insurgency-trafficker-weak state mix presents too many variables that obscure the impact of indigenous populations, and it more closely resembles two entrenched, opposing hierarchical organizations—one legal (the state) and one illegal (the

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<sup>1</sup> Bruce Hoffman, *Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Iraq*, OP-127-IPC/CMEPP (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2004), 10.

<sup>2</sup> US Department of Justice (Drug Enforcement Administration), Drug Intelligence Brief, *Changing Dynamics of Cocaine Production in the Andean Region* (June 2002). <Http://www.usdoj.gov/d ea/pubs/intel/02033/02033.html>. Accessed 23 October 2004.

*Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia*, or FARC) than it does networked organizations.<sup>3</sup> Despite the election of Alejandro Toledo in 2001, Peru was not selected because his election was more a popular reaction to Fujimori's corruption than it was a true triumph of ethnic politics, what Mainwaring calls "antiparty" politics.<sup>4</sup> In Ecuador, indigenous groups have made significant strides, which are highlighted by their uprisings in 2001 and the significant role their group played in the election of Colonel Lucio Gutierrez Borbua in 2002. However, their power is still closely linked to disaffected elites, and they have yet to stand alone to the extent demonstrated by ethnic groups in Bolivia.

Other researchers have focused on the gradual inclusion of ethnic peoples in the democratic processes of the state. Scholars such as Van Cott, Yashar and Larson have focused their studies on the degrees of ethnic peoples' inclusion within the state and individual rights by examining democratic legislation and governance structure. This thesis departs from their work by redirecting attention towards the relationships of indigenous groups among themselves, to specific actors within the state, foreign states, and non-state actors such as worldwide ethnic peoples coalitions, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), transnational criminal organizations (TCOs), and insurgencies (e.g., *Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia*). The linkages developed by these relationships provide indigenous groups with mechanisms for interactions with the state both within and outside of legal confines.

The increasing capacity of Bolivia's indigenous movements, combined with the weakness of the state, also makes these movements and linkages worthy of investigation. While ethnic revolution is highly unlikely, it is also quite unnecessary. Indigenous movements have access to resources like never before. These resources enable indigenous populations to undertake action that may serve their own interests, but may also contribute to national and regional instability. Essentially, these movements exist in an environment that supports their own independent action; however, this environment

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<sup>3</sup> In the context of this thesis, Colombia is useful as an example of what can occur when competing power structures are allowed to emerge and remain unchecked due to state or other weaknesses.

<sup>4</sup> Scott Mainwaring, "Party Systems in the Third Wave," *Journal of Democracy*, vol 9, no. 3 (July 1998): 71. Available from Project MUSE. [Http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/journal\\_of\\_democracy/v009/9\\_3mainwaring.html](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/journal_of_democracy/v009/9_3mainwaring.html). Accessed 5 January 2005.

also supports other nefarious factions that may operate beyond the vigilance of the state. And, while indigenous groups may be gaining ascendancy, neither they nor the state possess the capacity to control Bolivia's borders or its most rural regions. This weakness, combined with the decreasing transparency of indigenous groups, creates an environment that is conducive to exploitation by criminal and insurgent elements for their own purposes.

### C. HYPOTHESIS

Much of the literature on indigenous conflict in Latin America focuses on the relationship between state and indigenous movement. However, treating the various peoples' groups in Latin America (and the state, for that matter) as a single, unitary actor does not provide sufficient fidelity to explain periods of waxing and waning indigenous power. Indigenous peoples comprise nearly two-thirds of Bolivia's population. Although three major groups exist, Aymara: 1.6 million, Quechua: 2.5 million, and Guarani and others: approximately 92,000, they may be further subdivided into thirty-two groups based on language, culture and ethnicity (other groups include the Araucanians/Mapuchi, Uru, Ayoreo, Wichi, Mojena, Sirionos, Moxeños, Yuracares, Sireneires, More, Sansimonianos, Pausernas, Baures, Paunacas, Canichanas, Joras, Chacobos, Chamas, Tacanas, Chimanés, Movimas, Sinabos, Cayubabas and Itonomas).<sup>5</sup> Their diversity of interests and varying relationships among themselves and with other actors warrants deeper investigation; to assume that indigenous group identification, poor living conditions, and repressive state regimes are sufficient conditions for rebellion cannot explain why indigenous groups did not come to power even earlier.

This thesis argues that the explanation for the rise in indigenous power and capacity can more accurately be attributed to the internal and external structures of Bolivia's ethnic groups. In fact, their power can be explained through the organizational structures created by these relationships and interactions, and the "power" capacity that has been transferred through these linkages. Essentially, the structure of Bolivia's ethnic

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<sup>5</sup> Compiled from (1) Bret Gustafson, "Paradoxes of Liberal Indigenism: Indigenous Movements, State Processes, and Intercultural Reform in Bolivia," D. Maybury Lewis, ed., *The Politics of Ethnicity: Peoples in Latin American States* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002), 271 and (2) Javier Beltran, "*Indigenous and Traditional Peoples and Protected Areas: Principles, Guidelines and Case Studies*" (Norwich, UK: Page Brothers 2000), 38.

groups have transformed from tribal and hierarchical structures into networked structures that possess an inherent level of capacity to oppose the state and even thrive in its absence.

Some might argue the answer to the rise in indigenous power can be attributed to increasing levels of democratization. However, this argument does not account for the enduring power structures. While the greatest rise in power for Bolivia's indigenous population has occurred in the past twenty-five years, to assume that this is solely a recent phenomenon is also insufficient to explain their ascendancy. In fact, these groups have always wielded some form of power, the structures of which can be traced back to the fourteenth century Aymara kingdoms. Furthermore, not all of the indigenous groups, which occupied the area that would become Bolivia, experienced the same levels of exclusion or autonomy. What is significant about the last twenty-five years is that it is during this time period that indigenous groups became movements, resource availability improved, and the movements took advantage of political opportunities that presented themselves.

Others might argue that indigenous power is solely a function of their majority. However, if that were true, it does not explain why indigenous groups did not come to power sooner. Finally, one might argue that indigenous power can be explained simply by looking at their groups' ties with elites. However, as will be demonstrated, while these alliances have occurred in Bolivia's history, indigenous groups have also occupied inherent positions of strength which allowed them to impose their demands on elites.

#### **D. METHODOLOGY**

To understand the development of indigenous power in Bolivia, this thesis uses a combination of political economy and social movement theory to examine the relationships of major actors and the evolution of indigenous group organization. Political economy analysis is used to explain the various outcomes of the relationships of the actors to one another. To understand these outcomes, first the actors and their interests are defined. Second, the coalitions formed by actors with common interests and how these interests may have been altered as a result of forming coalitions is examined. Third, the institutional structures that govern decision-making and their effects on

outcomes are described. These structures may be both formal and informal. Formal mechanisms are essentially the legal means through which outcomes are produced (i.e., laws, treaties, accepted procedures, etc.). Informal mechanisms are those more directly related to soft power, or “influence short of violence.”<sup>6</sup> Finally, the outcomes produced by these coalitions and decision-making structures are examined. A key outcome that is helpful to this analysis is the examination of coalitions following decisions. Do these relationships endure? Or do actors defect to other preferences once their primary objectives are achieved? In his work on peasant mobilization, Singlemann identifies the difficulties of consolidating and sustaining power that all rising agents face:

...If we critically examine the kinds of interests served by the movements and the nature as well as limitations of their group solidarity, it becomes apparent that *campesinos* have not yet become a ‘class for itself.’ They are divided along several lines; many engage in temporary joint actions for limited purposes at a given time, but few have persisted in a sustained new efforts to renew the large social order.... Their ‘interest articulation’ thus does not necessarily emancipate them as a class.<sup>7</sup>

#### E. NETWAR

This thesis then draws on the work of Arquilla and Ronfeldt to help examine, describe and classify the relationships and outcomes using three organizational concepts (tribal/clan, hierarchical, and networked). Essentially, hierarchical forms organization, combined with market forms, favor the state, but limit “social equity.” The network form of organization is collaborative and adds strength to non-state organizations such as social movements.<sup>8</sup>

Networked organizations possess the greatest relative amount of inherent capacity. Networks offer opportunity and access to resources (and targets) that are less transparent and therefore less susceptible to surveillance and countering efforts. Network structure also allows weaker organizations to exist and endure in environments where

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<sup>6</sup> Joseph S. Nye, Jr., “Soft Power,” *Foreign Policy*, no. 80 (Autumn 1990): 166.

<sup>7</sup> Peter Singlemann, “The Closing Triangle: Critical Notes on a Model for Peasant Mobilization in Latin America,” *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, vol. 17. no. 4: Peasant Political Mobilization, (October 1975): 404. Available from JSTOR. [Http://links.jstor.org/sici?&sici=0010-4175%28197510%2917%3A4%3C389%3ATCTCNO%3E2.0.CO%3B2-X](http://links.jstor.org/sici?&sici=0010-4175%28197510%2917%3A4%3C389%3ATCTCNO%3E2.0.CO%3B2-X). Accessed 5 January 2005.

<sup>8</sup> John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, *The Advent of Netwar* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1996), 25-34.

they would otherwise fail if they attempted to remain organized along more transparent or hierarchical lines.

Ronfeldt, Arquilla and the Fullers describe the strength of networked organizations in *The Zapatistas and Social Netwar in Mexico*. Essentially, the *Ejercito Liberacion Zapata Nacional* increased their own resistance capacity and mitigated the state's coercion capacity by networking with international NGOs. This example helps illuminate the characteristics of threats emerging around the globe, and the rise of *netwar*:

an emerging form of conflict (and crime) at societal levels, involving measures short of traditional war. In which protagonists use network forms of organization and related doctrines, strategies and technologies attuned to the information age. These protagonists are likely to consist of small groups who communicate, coordinate, and conduct their small campaigns in an internetworked manner, without a precise central command.<sup>9</sup>

Gerlach and Hine define the properties of these networked protagonists with respect to social movements. This is pertinent to the thesis as indigenous power structures transform themselves from economic oriented organizations (unions) into true indigenous rights (social) movements (and combinations thereof). These groups exhibit the following characteristics known as “SPiNs”:

Segmentary: Composed of many diverse groups, which grow and die, divide and fuse, proliferate and contract.

Polycentric: Having multiple, often temporary, and sometimes competing leaders or centers of influence.

Networked: Forming a loose, reticulate, integrated network with multiple linkages through travelers, overlapping membership, joint activities, common reading matter, and shared ideals and opponents. Integrating factors are...what they (movements) share in common.<sup>10</sup>

For this thesis, the culmination of *netwar* and SPiNs is a potentially new type of insurgency in Latin America that could be considered a *third wave* to Wickham-Crowley's first and second waves.<sup>11</sup> What makes the third wave unique is that control of the state is

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<sup>9</sup> John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, *The Advent of Netwar* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1996), 5.

<sup>10</sup> Luther P. Gerlach and Virgina L. Hine, *The Structure of Social Movements: Environmental Activism and its Opponents*, John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, eds., *Networks and Netwars* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2001), 289-90, 299.

<sup>11</sup> Timothy P. Wickham-Crowley, *Guerrillas & Revolution in Latin America: A Comparative Study of Insurgents and Regimes Since 1956* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992), 5.

not the overall goal of the insurgents. Rather, because they can subsist outside of the state, efforts may be directed towards keeping the state weak. These groups may, in fact, direct their energies towards developing short and long-term cross-state support and governance structures that undermine legitimate state-directed development efforts. Also, insurgent (or opposition) leadership in the third wave is not necessarily a role for disaffected elites, as was the case during the first and second waves. Leadership may remain inherently indigenous.

#### **F. ACTORS**

The actors examined within this thesis include indigenous peoples (peasants, miners and urban laborers), *criollos*, mine owners, the military, elite liberals and conservatives, foreign states, the international community (IC), NGOs, TCOs and insurgents. Significant disparities that exist among otherwise common groups will be highlighted to the extent that their divisions create different outcomes. For example, tribes of similar ethnicity in proximity to one another may actually take different approaches to development and alliance-building based on the factor endowments provided by the land they occupy.

#### **G. DATA SOURCES**

A variety of sources are drawn from for this thesis. Specific historical evidence is selected from the research of Klein and Healy, as well as from historical documents and print media. Historical data are reinforced by the scholarly analyses of state development by Van Cott, Yashar and Larson. Works on indigenous movements published by Gill and Gustafson provide the foundation for highlighting diverse interests and approaches to government. Information is also drawn from internet and print-based documents provided by governments, indigenous organizations, political parties and NGOs. Finally, where possible, interviews with actors and researchers have been used to add fidelity to the argument.

#### **H. ROADMAP**

This thesis is chronologically organized into four subsequent chapters. Each chapter contains an examination of indigenous power and relationships based on the

political economy methodology, and covers the significant events that hallmark each period.

Chapter II begins with a brief synopsis of Bolivia's indigenous population following the arrival of the Spanish and leading up to the first major indigenous uprising: the Tupac Amaru rebellion of 1770. Part one covers the period from 1770 to Bolivia's independence in 1825. Part two of this chapter covers the developments of the post-Independence period through the termination of the War of the Pacific in 1880. It is during these periods that indigenous power was mostly a function of weak, power-seeking opposition elites, as well as the ability of ethnic groups to adapt.

Chapter III covers the period up to and including the seizure of power by the MNR in 1952-53. It addresses the role of economic development, the rise of socialism and major events such as the Chaco War and the rise of the MNR—indigenous relationship. It is during this period when the cracks in the dam start to appear with the respect to rising indigenous power. Indigenous groups slowly begin to organize along indigenous (vice economic) lines and strengthen their internal network. Although not recognized at the time (and not that it could have been), it is during this period that the subtle tipping point occurs in favor of indigenous ascendancy.

Chapter IV covers the period from 1954 to 2004, and it argues that, during this time, indigenous movements developed into networked organizations. Increased regional and international linkages achieved greater levels during this period for all of the actors examined. It is also during this period when peasant and workers unions gain strength, from which emerge purely indigenous rights and interest-oriented movements.

Chapter V summarizes the arguments of the previous chapters and presents the major findings of the thesis. First, cleavages among Bolivia's indigenous peoples existed prior to, during and beyond the times of Spanish conquest; these cleavages were the result of both internal and external actors and interests. Second, these cleavages have traditionally been a source of weakness for indigenous populations. However, the effects of this are becoming mitigated by evolution towards network structures. Third, the rise of ethnic power in Bolivia was closely linked to the pursuit of power by elite minorities.

Fourth, alliances with domestic elites and foreign actors, reinforced by increasing access to support systems (health, education, governance, etc.) and communication technologies, have fostered the slow saturation of traditionally elite-dominated realms by the indigenous society. In essence, it has been a slow revolution-from-below that is usurping traditional power sources of the state without an overthrow or replacement of government.

Fifth, the regional and international internetworked character of Bolivia's indigenous population, combined with the weakness of the state, provides these movements with options outside of the state's legal framework if conditions deteriorate. Sixth, these organizations are less susceptible than their predecessors to elite influence. Foreign and non-state actors, combined with improved communication technologies have provided indigenous groups with sources of power that allow them to indirectly challenge the state. Finally, indigenous groups have become significant actors that should be reflected in US foreign policy towards the region.

## I. BOLIVIA BEFORE THE 16TH CENTURY

### 1. Geography

Modern day Bolivia is roughly the size of Montana and consists of three geographical regions. First is the *Altiplano*, tucked between the *Cordillera Occidental* and *Cordillera Real* ranges, that comprises most of Bolivia's western border. Its land is arable and is suitable for grazing. North-south communications are plentiful; however, these mountain ranges limit east-west trafficability to specific mountain passes.

To the east of the *Altiplano* lie river valleys and semi-tropical climates known as *Los Yungas* and *El Chapare*. *Los Yungas* lies generally east of La Paz and turns into *El Chapare* as the mountains begin to flatten out in the Cochabamba region. Both areas are suitable for producing a variety of crops, including fruit, maize, coca, and coffee. East of this region lie sea level plains that are suitable for agriculture. They also possess expansive hydrocarbon deposits. Because these areas are prone to flooding, they were some of the last areas settled by people pushing west from Argentina/Paraguay/Brazil and east from the *Altiplano*.

Beyond these plains lies the *Chaco* in southeastern Bolivia, and the Amazon in northeastern Bolivia. The *Chaco* is a virtual wasteland of scrub brush. It was not until the 19<sup>th</sup> century that modern expansion into the area with commercial agricultural practices made it suitable for crop cultivation and livestock.

## 2. People

The thirteen Aymara kingdoms spanned the area from just south of Cuzco along the Andean ridge and highlands. Its southernmost kingdom, Chichas, extended southwards beyond Potosi. These kingdoms reigned from the twelfth through the sixteenth centuries.

The Aymara governed their societies along both tribal and hierarchical lines, and they were organized around familial structures (*ayllus*). There was no private land ownership, save that set aside for the nobility and local chieftains (*caciques*). The nobility organized labor and ensured distribution of goods among the population. Labor was organized around the *mita* system, which drafted workers for temporary periods and distributed the workload among the population.

To sustain those regions less suitable for agriculture, the Aymara established colonies in the more fertile eastern regions. It was essentially a “colony-core” system.<sup>12</sup> Crops grown in these areas were transported west to the population centers. The eastern colonies brought the Aymara (and later the Inca) into contact with plain’s tribes of what would later become Brazil, Paraguay and Argentina.

Despite their subjugation by the Quechua (Inca) in the mid-fifteenth century, the Aymara were allowed to maintain their organizational structures so long as they continued to provide tribute to Cuzco. The Incas controlled and governed the Aymara using local structures and leadership. It was the same type of indirect rule used by the British in India, and it would prove to be a recurring theme in Bolivia’s history.

The Incan conquest would make it as far south as modern-day northern Argentina, as well as into the Cochabamba Valley. However, the Inca were unable to penetrate into the eastern portions of modern-day Bolivia. The indigenous populations occupying these

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<sup>12</sup> Herbert S. Kline, *A Concise History of Bolivia* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 15.

areas would remain cutoff from western Bolivia until the Wars of Independence began in the early 1800s.

While the indigenous peoples were not completely interconnected, when the Spanish arrived they found that significant links and organizations did exist in western Bolivia. The peoples were still organized and governed along a mix of tribal and hierarchical lines by the Inca. Their workforce was organized, and it could be converted into armies when necessary. However, although connected, at this time subordinate ethnic populations could not collectively revolt against their Inca masters. In fact, aside from local rebellions, the first major Indian uprising against the Spanish would not occur until the Tupac Amaru rebellion of 1870.




Figure 1. Map of Bolivia<sup>13</sup>

<sup>13</sup> United Nations Cartographic Section. Reprinted with permission of the United Nations Publication Board on 14 February 2005.

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## **II. SEEDS OF A MOVEMENT: 1770-1879**

### **A. INTRODUCTION**

As the Spanish contended with developing ways to administer and control its viceroyalties from across the Atlantic Ocean during the eighteenth century, tensions began to mount between the native-born Spanish (*peninsulares*) and those born in the New World (*criollos*). As with their North American-born English counterparts, *criollos* began to resent their subordinate position to the crown. This resentment began to manifest itself in efforts to undermine royal authority in the New World. What role the ethnic populations could play in this contest, other than providing labor for agriculture and mining, was given little concern by elites. In the eyes of the elites, the Indians would remain under heel, whether it was that of the *peninsulare* or that of the *criollos*.

What was not understood at the time was that Bolivia's ethnic population had some capacity to be a force of their own in the colonial and 19<sup>th</sup> century. Through a combination of existing structure and shrewd adaptability, they were able to use the rules of Spanish governance to achieve a position of relative strength. This trend would endure until the rise of the private mining elite.

This chapter examines the interests of Bolivia's indigenous peoples and their relationship to various elite actors. By identifying inherent ethnic governance structures, and elite reliance on ethnic populations to buttress their own pursuits, this chapter argues that indigenous resilience and power were a function four factors: their own inherent strength and adaptability, weak power-seeking elites, exploitation of Spanish colonial law, and the unique geography of the region.

The organizational structures of the ethnic populations were communal and tribal, and they were sufficient for subsistence. People within these communities were organized into an upper (organizing and ruling class) and a lower (labor) class. In return for their labor, the upper classes ensured that their communities were provided for. Ties among communities were strengthened by agricultural and livestock trade, as well as

through marriage.<sup>14</sup> While sufficient for subsistence, the resources available through these networks were not enough to enable ethnic populations to resist the Spanish unilaterally.

Several factors actually weakened these networks that otherwise functioned efficiently for subsistence. Disputes among displaced Indians over original lands, different modes of labor and production, and differing attitudes towards the Spanish viceroyalty all would serve to weaken indigenous linkages.<sup>15</sup> The factor that would provide ethnic groups with the greatest leverage would be their ability to integrate themselves into elite interests.

Section one of this chapter focuses on the interests and coalitions leading up to the Tupac Amaru rebellion in 1780 through Bolivia's declaration of independence in 1825. What is most significant about the Tupac Amaru rebellion is that, in fact, the *criollo* population actually followed on the coat tails of the Indians.<sup>16</sup> The power demonstrated by the ethnic population, particularly in rural areas, foreshadows the indigenous mass mobilization theme that is recurrent in Bolivia's history. Section two examines the period following independence through the end of the War of the Pacific in 1879. This is a significant period in Bolivia because it marks the first time when mining profits surpassed the amount of revenue generated by the individual Indian tax. It was during this period that the state became less reliant on its indigenous population. This, in turn, reduced the amount of economic leverage indigenous populations could apply towards retaining the authority to self-govern, and it forced them to attempt to exercise arguably weaker power through the Spanish legal system.

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<sup>14</sup> Joseph W. Bastien, "Land Litigation in an Andean Ayllu from 1592 until 1972," *Ethnohistory*, vol. 26, no. 2 (Spring 1972): 105. Available from JSOTR. [Http://links.jstor.org/sici?&sici=0014-1801%281972%2926%3A2%3C101%3ALLIAAA%3E2.0.CO%3B2-8](http://links.jstor.org/sici?&sici=0014-1801%281972%2926%3A2%3C101%3ALLIAAA%3E2.0.CO%3B2-8). Accessed 5 January 2005.

<sup>15</sup> Ward Stavig, "Ethnic Conflict, Moral Economy, and Population in Rural Cuzco on the Eve of the Thupa Amaro II Rebellion," *The Hispanic American Historical Review*, vol. 68, no. 4 (November 1998): 739. Available from JSOTR. [Http://links.jstor.org/sici?&sici=0018-2168%28198811%2968%3A4%3C737%3AECMAP%3E2.0.CO%3B2-P](http://links.jstor.org/sici?&sici=0018-2168%28198811%2968%3A4%3C737%3AECMAP%3E2.0.CO%3B2-P). Accessed 5 January 2005.

<sup>16</sup> Herbert S. Klein, *A Concise History of Bolivia* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 76.

## B. SECTION ONE: 1770—1825

The Tupac Amaru revolt was a watershed event in the indigenous history of the region. The rebellion lasted from 1770 to 1772, and it was conducted in generally two phases.<sup>17</sup> The first phase was conducted around the Viceroyalty of Cuzco, while the second was conducted further south in Upper Peru (Bolivia). The aim of the first phase was to directly challenge Spanish rule. However, it did not represent a populist, mass peasant uprising. Rather, as Campbell demonstrates, it was a carefully crafted uprising that was organized around Indian leaders.<sup>18</sup> These leaders inspired the masses with ideas of reversion to an indigenous paradise under the direction of Tomas Katari.<sup>19</sup>

The second phase extended as far south as Oruro and included La Paz; but its goals were markedly different from the first phase. At the heart of the revolt was the issue of corrupt or ineffective local governance by local Spanish officials and *caciques*. During this period, three factors provide evidence of indigenous strength. First, the revolt was coupled with legal action. The revolt was directed in a way to signal that indigenous grievances were not with the “viceroyalty,” but with local officials. Second, the revolt was generally Indian led. It was only subsequent to the siege of Cuzco that *criollos* became more directly involved in the revolt, seeking to shrug off royal control in favor of their own. Third, the Indians were able to raise an indigenous army of up to 40,000 people, and they were able to disrupt movement and commerce over such a wide area.<sup>20</sup> Although previous Indian revolts had occurred, they were generally localized events of a much smaller scale in terms of numbers of rebels.

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<sup>17</sup> While 1780 marks the first major violence in the Tupac Amaru rebellion, Serulnikov traces its specific events in 1777, and to the general conditions that existed among the Spanish, *criollos*, and Indians around 1770 in: Sergio Serulnikov, *Subverting Colonial Authority: Challenges to Spanish Rule in Eighteenth-Century Southern Andes* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2003), 126.

<sup>18</sup> Leon G. Campbell, “Social Structure of the Tupac Amaru Army in Cuzco, 1780-80,” *The Hispanic American Historical Review*, vol. 16, no. 4 (November 1981): 690-691. Available from JSOTR. [Http://links.jstor.org/sici?si=0018-68%28198111%2961%3A4%3C675%3ASSOTTA%3E2.0.CO%3B2-Z](http://links.jstor.org/sici?si=0018-68%28198111%2961%3A4%3C675%3ASSOTTA%3E2.0.CO%3B2-Z). Accessed 5 January 2005.

<sup>19</sup> Sergio Serulnikov, *Subverting Colonial Authority: Challenges to Spanish Rule in Eighteenth-Century Southern Andes* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2003), 127.

<sup>20</sup> Herbert S. Kline, *A Concise History of Bolivia* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 75.

Eventually, the Indians and the *criollos* proved no match for the Spanish. Spanish efforts had been reinforced by loyalists (loyal *criollos* as well as some *caciques*). In the rebellion's aftermath, the *criollos* were brought under tighter control, and the *cacique* class was officially abolished. However, as it will be explained in the outcomes portion of this section, the end of the *caciques* did not mean an end to indigenous governance. Rather, it demonstrates Spanish recognition of the Indians' acknowledgement of their subordinate but official role in the kingdom. The Spanish decision not to destroy communal governance was the result of a limited balance of power achieved by the Indians.

## 1. Actors and Interests

### a. Indigenous Population

For the purpose of assessing this period in history, this study breaks down indigenous groups into three general categories based on geography and “occupation.” These categories are the western (mining/urban labor), central (rural/agricultural) and eastern (rural/agricultural/nomadic) groups.

Both central and eastern groups are similar in that the majority of work for both populations was agriculturally based. Both populations provided for their own subsistence, and both possessed their own form of internal organization. They were organized along familial lines into *ayllus*. The *ayllus* were further broken down into upper and lower classes. Despite placing both agricultural indigenous populations into two categories, a finer distinction can be drawn with the Rural/Agriculture group.

Their *cacique*-led hierarchical/familial organization was underpinned by tensions between those Indians who remained on communal lands and those who migrated between *haciendas*, urban areas and communal lands. The former, known as *originarios* were in a relatively more secure position than the latter (*forasteros*) because they controlled access to their communal lands. So long as there was ample room, *forasteros* would be accommodated. However, as communal lands and *haciendas* began to compete with one another for space, there was not always room on communal lands to accommodate the *forasteros*. Some were turned away; those who were granted permission to return to communal lands were often assigned a lower status than the

*originarios*. This cleavage is further evidence of the internal stratification that runs counter to understanding Bolivia's indigenous movements as homogenous entities.

The indigenous population used for mining, also subjugated to colonial rule and existing under arguably harsher conditions, had interests that were somewhat different than their rural counterparts. Miners were (low) wage earners. They were not landowners, and they did not provide for their own subsistence. As such, their interests were more aligned with the traditional, universal interests of urban workers: better pay and working conditions, the right to organize and exercise voice in the workplace.

Western and central agrarian tribes shared four major interests. First was the right to occupy, own and cultivate their traditional lands. This often led to divisions among the Indians who had been displaced by the Spanish, and those resettled onto their lands. Second was the right to continue to practice self-governance. Third was a reduction in the amount of taxes levied on their communities. Under mitigating circumstances, such as poor harvests as a result of drought, the viceroyalty might reduce or waive a season's community tax. In other cases, communities actually underreported the number of people living on their land in order to reduce their tribute burden. Fourth was for better treatment at the hands local authorities (*caciques* and *corregidores*).

*Caciques* occupied a precarious position during this era. They continually had to balance the interests of the indigenous population against the requirements of the Spanish "governors." As with all positions of authority, *caciques* were also vulnerable to their own interests, which may have not been related to their constituency, such as expanding their own coffers. In some cases, *caciques* adopted colonial ruling measures, selling land for their own profit and expanding patronage practices. *Caciques* are also known to have levied unauthorized taxes (in addition to the Crown's legal taxes). Different loyalties among the *caciques* would lead to cleavages among the indigenous population that were exacerbated in some cases by their own corruptness.

Despite similar desires for autonomy and the use of traditional lands, there were also differences between Bolivia's Altiplano and Chapare-based central tribes and

those that who lived on Bolivia's eastern Chaco frontiers.<sup>21</sup> The latter's contact was mostly with Jesuit (and later Franciscan) missionaries who were initially charged with expanding the influence of the Crown, offering in return conversion and education. The key to understanding the relationship between the Church, state and southeastern Indians lies in the geography of the Crown's expansion.

Bolivia's Chaco region is situated on what were the fringes of the Viceroyalties of Upper Peru and Rio de la Plata. The Church established missions in this area, but it was limited in its ability to take control of the Indians.<sup>22</sup> The Crown did not possess enough military resources to garrison this frontier from either its Atlantic or Pacific hubs, resulting in a more complementary relationship between the Indians and the Church. Semi-sedentary Indians, already adept at agriculture, more readily developed closer ties with the Church, unlike the nomadic Indians who continued their mobile existence. In fact, some Indians had actually asked the Crown for missions to settle in their areas in order to gain access to the resources associated with them.<sup>23</sup> Conversely, when the republican state began its expansion into the Chaco during the twentieth century, these Indians and the Church developed closer ties with one another in order to blunt the state's penetration. The Franciscans had fallen out of favor with the state because their use of Church lands was not viewed as efficient in a liberal, market economy.

Another difference is that western and central Indians were more closely tied to Spanish-controlled urban population centers such as La Paz and Cochabamba, and they were ultimately subjugated to Spanish colonial rule (which included requirements to pay taxes on their communal lands). Eastern Indians continued to be relatively insulated

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<sup>21</sup>Resources on Bolivia's southeastern Indians available in English are somewhat limited. This is due partially to the fact that these are more closely related to those found in Argentina and Paraguay. As such, most of the useful literature on Bolivia's southeastern tribes was found in studies of Argentina and Paraguay's Indian populations.

<sup>22</sup>Erick D. Langer and Robert H. Jackson, "Colonial and Republican Missions Compared: The Cases of Alta California and Southeastern Bolivia," *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, vol. 30, no. 2 (April 1988): 288-289. Available from JSOTR. [Http://links.jstor.org/sici?&sici=0010-4175%28198804%2930%3A2%3C286%3ACARMCT%3E2.0.CO%3B2-A](http://links.jstor.org/sici?&sici=0010-4175%28198804%2930%3A2%3C286%3ACARMCT%3E2.0.CO%3B2-A). Accessed 5 January 2005.

<sup>23</sup>James Schofield Saeger, "Another View of the Mission as a Frontier Institution: The Guaycuruan Reductions of Santa Fe, 1743-1810," *The Hispanic American Historical Review*, vol. 65, no. 3 (August 1985): 501. Available from JSOTR. [Http://links.jstor.org/sici?&sici=0018-2168%28198508%2965%3A3%3C493%3AAVOTMA%3E2.0.CO%3B2-E](http://links.jstor.org/sici?&sici=0018-2168%28198508%2965%3A3%3C493%3AAVOTMA%3E2.0.CO%3B2-E). Accessed 5 January 2005.

from the Spanish Crown. Sedentary Indians of the eastern frontiers gradually developed ties with Catholic missionaries. The nomadic tribes continued their mobile existence, often raiding the villages established by the sedentary Indians and the Church.<sup>24</sup>

**b. Criollos**

The *criollos* shared a single common interest with their colonial governors, and that was the maintenance of a system that provided stable and cheap labor capable of generating revenue. However, similar to their North American English counterparts, the *criollos* became increasingly weary of the *peninsulares*' governance. To that end, they desired to shrug off their royal masters and slowly began to develop ideas about autonomy and independence during this period. The competition that did exist among the *criollos* was similar to the *haciendados*; both had to compete with one another, as well as with communal lands that were required to pay tribute for labor.

**c. Spanish Administration**

Aside from maintaining the conditions necessary to generate revenue, the Spanish had no interest in granting more autonomy to the *criollos*. However, the Spanish still were faced with the challenges which all expeditions, whether civil or military encounter, how to maximize their gains with minimal resources (these challenges were exacerbated by competing loyalties among Spanish viceroyalties when the Spanish Crown fell to French control in 1808). Their solution with regard to the indigenous population was similar to that used by the British in India, indirect rule.

A second mechanism for extending control was the forced colonization of central and eastern Bolivia.<sup>25</sup> Somewhat similar to the United States' westward expansion towards the Pacific during the middle and late Nineteenth Century, the Spanish began to establish frontier towns in the Cochabamba Valley (and other points south and east) as mechanisms for consolidating resources and controlling popular routes. While the Agricultural/Rural Indians still retained control of the countryside, this era marks the first significant penetration of central Bolivia by the Spanish.

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<sup>24</sup>Barbara Ganson, "The Evuevi of Paraguay: Adaptive Strategies and Responses to Colonialism, 1528-1811," *The Americas*, vol. 45, no. 4 (April 1989): 473. Available from JSOTR. [Http://links.jstor.org/sici?&sci=0003-1615%28198904%2945%3A4%3C461%3ATEOPAS%3E2.0.CO%3B2-R](http://links.jstor.org/sici?&sci=0003-1615%28198904%2945%3A4%3C461%3ATEOPAS%3E2.0.CO%3B2-R). Accessed 5 January 2005.

<sup>25</sup> Robert Wooster, *The Military and United States Indian Policy, 1865-1903* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1988), 9.

The mines during this time remained under direct Spanish control. Labor requirements continued to be filled by the indigenous population by continuation of the *mita* system. The *mita* had, in fact, begun under the Inca. The most significant difference between the two was the provisions made for the *mitayos*. Under the Inca, *mitas* were generally convened for specific periods or tasks, during which the Incan government provided for the subsistence of the workers. Under the Spanish, *mitayos* were paid a negligible wage, and they were forced to provide for themselves. *Mita* contracts were often extended, and the Indians were often forced to purchase their wares and foodstuffs directly from the Spanish, thereby further exacerbating tensions among them.

## 2. Groupings

Different attitudes towards the Spanish among the Indians led to divisions that often resulted in intra-ethnic violence. This was not necessarily a function of Indians being dragooned into elite armies, rather, these divisions were based on deliberate decisions made by Indian leaders. During this period, three general factions developed. The first group was composed solely of indigenous peoples which led the revolt directly against Cuzco. As described above, they directly challenged Spanish governance and hoped to return to traditional Fourteenth Century ethnic governance structures.

Second was the coalition of Indian and *criollo* in Upper Peru, specifically in Oruro. This group intended to replace Spanish control with their own form of government. What is most significant about this group is that the Indians initiated this revolt while the *criollos* adopted a wait and see attitude. This marks one of the few times in Bolivia's history when elites and semi-elites followed the lead of the indigenous population.

The third coalition was that between the loyal *cacique* and the viceroyalty. These actors preferred the status quo.<sup>26</sup> The latter preferred this because it continued to support an efficient system of colonial extraction. The former preferred this because of the stability they had found by allowing themselves to be subsumed into the Crown. As will

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<sup>26</sup>Herbert S. Kline, *A Concise History of Bolivia* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 76-77.

be explained later, not all Indians were denied access to the Crown's legal system, and the Crown often ruled in the Indian's favor.

An ancillary influence on the options available to all actors was geography. Geography limited the penetration of the state, and had a limiting effect on intraethnic communications. The rural population retained control of the countryside and routinely led localized revolts. Geography created divisions among *Altiplano* and valley indigenous communities for control of traditional Inca-distributed lands. Although ethnic populations controlled these lands, they had passed among various groups based on redistribution by the Spanish. The outlier Indians remained isolated from the Crown, save limited penetration by religious missionaries.

### **3. Decision-making Structures**

Two decision-making structures are significant during this period. The first was colonial law as established by the Spanish Crown. The second was the use of indirect rule by the Spanish. Royal governance and jurisdiction were significant in that the Indians actually devised methods to use these systems to their advantage. While one might assume that their only usefulness was to control the Indian population, in fact, the opposite was just as true. As demonstrated by Sergio Serulnikov, the Indians worked within the legal confines of the system to bring grievances against corrupted *corregidores* and *caciques*. Their adherence to the legal system, and their deliberate, general promptness in submitting their tributes, signaled to the Spanish viceroyalty that they acknowledged Spanish authority.<sup>27</sup> What they sought in return for their submissiveness was relief from tyrannical, corrupt local Spanish and indigenous officials.

In addition to the limited direct voice the Indians had in Spanish governance, they were allowed to retain their internal organizational and governance structures. This limited autonomy provided the Indians with some control over their lives and served as a mechanism to sustain their interests. It also promoted some competition among populations to ensure they would be able to meet their tax obligations.

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<sup>27</sup> Sergio Serulnikov, "Subverting Colonial Authority: Challenges to Spanish Rule in Eighteenth-Century Southern Andes (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2003), 152.

#### **4. Outcomes**

As a result of the failed rebellion, the Spanish abolished the *cacique* class and took direct control of the free communities. However, the failure of this revolt was more significant to the *criollos*, who lost their ability to govern. Because the Spanish still faced the problems associated with expedition, the Indians were still allowed to retain and work their communal lands and they were allowed to govern themselves (just under greater Spanish observation and scrutiny). In fact, many local indigenous leaders were elevated to carry out those functions which had previously been performed by the *cacique* class.

During the two decades leading up to the creation of *República Bolívar*, and shortly thereafter Bolivia, another factor affected the power capacity of the indigenous population. It was during this time that mining revenues rapidly declined because of the destruction of mines during the Wars of Independence. The result was an increased reliance by the Crown (and subsequently Bolivia) on the Indian populations' ability to generate revenue. Although the communal land tax was abandoned in favor of an individual Indian tax, the Indian population also received greater protection by the Spanish from the *criollos* because the Indians became the prime generators of revenue. Agriculture and textiles replaced mining as the primary sources of revenue for the state, and communal lands became even more protected by the state from encroaching *haciendados*.

This period marked an expansion of indigenous capacity; the Crown still relied on indigenous communities for resource extraction. The real losers were the *criollos*, who had their power checked by the Crown. However, this relationship would not last. Following independence, the Bolivian government and the mine owners in the state would move closer together at the expense of the indigenous population. The next section describes this evolution.

#### **5. Networks**

In terms of relative strength, the indigenous populations during this period could not be characterized as networked. Although segmented and polycephalous, they were not integrated (although the Tupac Amaru revolt does provide evidence of a capacity to

coordinate). At this time, indigenous populations still did not have access to the resources that would enable them to challenge the superior coercive strength of the Spanish. In the north, this was more significant because of their challenge to actually overthrow Spanish authority. In the south, this was less so because the ethnic population, which had in earlier times been subjugated to Inca rule, was not trying to overthrow Spanish rule. Rather, they acknowledged Spanish authority and sought its help to redress local, but widespread, grievances.<sup>28</sup>

The links among indigenous nodes were still bound by geography and somewhat controlled by the Spanish, and indigenous nodes possessed inferior resources for coercive resistance. Those links between the indigenous population and the Spanish did not facilitate the transfer of coercive capacity from the latter to the former. There was also no opportunity for the indigenous population to establish links with nodes beyond themselves or the Spanish. As demonstrated by the Tupac Amaru rebellion, buttressed by *criollos* and by the understanding achieved by the Spanish and the Indians, indigenous coercive power was still very much a function of their linkages with elites.

## C. SECTION TWO: 1826—1879

### 1. Actor and Interests

#### a. *Indigenous Population*

Following Bolivia's independence, the interests of agricultural/rural and mining/urban Indians remained relatively unchanged. However, tensions continued to exist among Indian communities based on the competition for communal land rights and labor sufficient to meet tribute and subsistence requirements. Redistribution of Aymara lands under the Spanish compounded grievances among *altiplano* and valley Indians as the former attempted to regain their traditional lands.<sup>29</sup>

#### b. *The State*

The *criollos* and former *penisulares* had become the new state elite in Bolivia, and both were dedicated to the increasing state and personal wealth and strength.

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<sup>28</sup> Sergio Serulnikov, "Subverting Colonial Authority: Challenges to Spanish Rule in Eighteenth-Century Southern Andes (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2003), 149.

<sup>29</sup> Brooke Larson, *Cochabamba, 1550—1990: Colonialism and Agrarian Transformation in Bolivia* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1998), 43.

These elites sought to stabilize Bolivia and sought foreign investment to expand Bolivia's development.

Despite the creation of an official state, Bolivia's boundaries were by no means settled. While Bolivia struggled to expand its influence and gain control of its interior, it also began the arduous task of conducting international relations with its regional neighbors. Bolivia's ability to trade remained one of its core necessities, and in order to trade, Bolivia required access to the sea. Bolivia's primary access to the sea was via ports at Cobija and Arica on its Pacific coasts, which were eventually lost as a result of the War of the Pacific. Access to the Atlantic was attempted using the Paraguay and Pilcomayo Rivers between Paraguay and Argentina, respectively. Use of these waterways was precarious. Both are seasonal rivers and are marginally navigable at best. Furthermore, the paucity of navigation legislation once beyond Bolivia's borders in Paraguay made river-borne commerce financially risky.<sup>30</sup> During this period, Bolivia would continually fight losing battles against the erosion of its borders.

#### *c. Mine Owners*

The arrival of the state as an actor during this period coincided the rise of the private mine owner. The mining population favored privatization, although it had little use for the new state government outside of creating the free-market conditions necessary to expand their industry. The ability of the mining industry to generate revenue would make its control –a struggle between privatization and nationalization – a particularly volatile, recurring theme in Bolivia's history.

### **2. Groupings and Decision-Making Structures**

The state and mine owners, based on their common interests and complimentary relationship, formed a coalition during this period. The ethnic population still remained somewhat fractured between urban and rural areas, *altiplano* and Cochabamba valley, and hacienda and communal lands.

Increasingly, the state began to favor legislation that supported the mining industry and privatization. The Indian communal lands were no longer the most

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<sup>30</sup> J. Valerie Fifer, *Bolivia, Land, Location, and Politics since 1825* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1972), 162.

significant source of revenue for the state, nor were they even a close second. Despite the favoritism shown toward the mining industry, the mine owners took little interest in the development of the state (outside of mining activities).

### **3. Outcomes**

A combination of the silver boom of the 1860s and the War of the Pacific in 1879 produced several significant outcomes. Based on the disruptions to state and industry caused by the War of the Pacific, the mining elites were no longer satisfied to remain on the sideline of national politics. As a result, they resolved to take an active role in state politics in order to attempt to prevent such future catastrophes. To that end, they also began to pursue more efficient forms of economic activity, which included the privatization of land ownership.

Privatization included the abolition of communal lands during this period, which resulted in the rapid expansion of the *hacienda* system and forced many Indians off of communal lands. The intent was to make the Indian a citizen, whereby the state could exercise direct legal control over the population. This new *campesino* class was expected to commoditize its labor capacity for both urban and rural industries.<sup>31</sup> However, the coercive capacities of the mine owners and *hacendados* greatly outweighed any ability of the *campesinos* to unite for common interests. Mining and agriculture unions would not be allowed to form until the early Twentieth Century.

### **4. Networks**

This period marked a significant decline in terms of indigenous capacity. Had it continued, the base for indigenous power may have been completely extirpated. Expansion of the *hacienda* system and the *mita* for the mining industry increased the displacement of indigenous population. This led to fragmentation along not only rural-urban lines, but also among rural population due to the displacement caused by mining booms and busts. Thus, indigenous groups were even more divided than they had been prior to Bolivia's independence.

These groups still did not possess any significant links outside of Bolivia, and their cohesion derived from inherent social, cultural and governing structures based on

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<sup>31</sup> Eric D. Langer, "Andean Rituals of Revolt: The Chayanta Rebellion of 1927," *Ethnohistory*, vol. 37, no. 3 (Summer 1990): 229. Available from JSTOR. [Http://links.jstor.org/sici?&sci=0014-1801%28199022%2937%3A3%3C227%3AARORTC%3E2.0.CO%3B2-Y](http://links.jstor.org/sici?&sci=0014-1801%28199022%2937%3A3%3C227%3AARORTC%3E2.0.CO%3B2-Y). Accessed 5 January 2005.

communal land ownership were also challenged during this time (see Figure 2). The reduction of the number of communal lands as a result of the expansion of the *hacienda* system produced fewer communal leaders, moving indigenous groups away from network-organized social structures. During this period, it was those rural communities that existed on the fringes of state control that maintained the cultural and societal links to keep a concept of indigenous identity afloat.

Attempts by indigenous groups to coalesce into local governance structures occurred at the expense of establishing a greater-Bolivia indigenous movement. This is not to suggest that these groups were attempting to establish a statewide movement and failing. Rather, this period was a time of establishing local organization and learning how to work within the new state power structure as Bolivia transitioned from colonial rule to independence.

#### **D. CONCLUSION**

The period from the 1700s through 1879 can be classified as a period of waxing and waning power for the indigenous populations. Their power was limited by internally and externally generated cleavages, little or no access to resources other than for the purposes of subsistence and tribute, and mining's usurpation of agriculture as the state's primary revenue producer. However, the state was never able to gain control of the population, either through inclusion or exclusion. While the indigenous groups possessed no economic power compared to the Spanish or Bolivian elite, this did not prevent them from adapting and functioning under their rulers.




Figure 2. Early Networks and Relationships

During this period, indigenous groups achieved little international voice and had yet to establish links outside of Bolivia. Missionaries and the Church are examples of early forms of linkages that began to connect ethnic populations to non-state actors and give them voice outside their borders. This trickle would eventually become a torrent with the introduction of communication technologies and the emergence of international organizations specifically designed to give voice to indigenous concerns.

Despite the ascendancy of the mining elite and the state, their power would remain checked by internal weakness and international factors. Not only were they vulnerable to the availability of labor and world markets for silver, the fledgling state itself also struggled with its neighbors to define its borders, all while gradually losing its direct access to the sea.<sup>32</sup> In the early 20th Century, these international factors and actors, combined with shifting interests and power structures, would mark the most

<sup>32</sup> J. Valerie Fifer, *Bolivia, Land, Location, and Politics since 1825* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1972), 19-31. Fifer points out that Bolivia was in the worst of all possible positions. The state's limited capacity to control its indigenous population, its landlocked geography, and its reliance on foreign capital to underpin a purely extractive economy significantly impaired its ability to pay the price of admission into the international system.

significant shift in strength among Bolivia's actors, and it would mark the subtle “tipping point” for Bolivia’s indigenous population.<sup>33</sup>

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<sup>33</sup> This definition of tipping point differs from Gladwell's [see Malcolm Gladwell, *The Tipping Point: How Little Things can Make a Big Difference* (Lebanon, IN: Back Bay Books, 2002)] in that what was occurring in Bolivia was a slow change. Unlike epidemics which are readily observable, what was occurring in Bolivia with respect to indigenous capacity was occurring with the subtleness of a flood tide.

### III. CULTIVATION: 1900—1953

#### A. INTRODUCTION

By the end of the nineteenth century, Bolivia's mining elites had broken the state's hold over the industry. These elites, along with the military, began to exert greater influence in government as Bolivia struggled to define itself as a country.

Internationally, Bolivia was attempting to find its place in world diplomacy and economy while devising ways to attract foreign investment.<sup>34</sup> Bolivia also undertook efforts to attract foreign colonists to explore and settle its north and southeastern frontiers.<sup>35</sup> Regionally it struggled over economic and political relationships with its neighbors.<sup>36</sup> All the while, Bolivia struggled domestically over not only who would run the state, but also how its people would be organized to promote development. Central to Bolivia's development was the question over what role its indigenous population would play. Key events that shaped Bolivia's indigenous populations during this period included the rise of Bolivia's Left, the revolt that transferred the capital from Sucre to La Paz, and the Chaco War and its fallout.

The most significant event for Bolivia's indigenous population during this period was the *Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario* (MNR) party's overthrow of the military regime, presided over by General Hugo Ballivian, in 1952. This chapter argues that, during the period from the late nineteenth century to the middle of the twentieth century, Bolivia's indigenous movements developed an organizational base that solidified

<sup>34</sup>The Act of 1905 encouraged immigrants to move to Bolivia and help settle her eastern lands. This effort ultimately was a failure. For more information on settlement patterns in eastern Bolivia, see: J. Valerie Fifer, "The Search for a Series of Small Successes: Frontiers of Settlement in Eastern Bolivia," *Journal of Latin American Studies*, vol. 14, no. 2 (November 1982): 410. Available from JSOTR. [Http://links.jstor.org/sici?&sici=0022-216X%28198211%2914%3A2%3C407%3ATSFASO%3E2.0.CO%3B2-9](http://links.jstor.org/sici?&sici=0022-216X%28198211%2914%3A2%3C407%3ATSFASO%3E2.0.CO%3B2-9). Accessed 5 January 2005.

<sup>35</sup>Lewis A. Tambs, "Rubber, Rebels, and Rio Branco: The Contest for Acre," *The Hispanic American Historical Review*, vol. 46, no. 3 (August 1966): 263. Available from JSOTR. [Http://links.jstor.org/sici?&sici=0018-2168%28196608%2946%3A3%3C254%3ARRARBT%3E2.0.CO%3B2-0](http://links.jstor.org/sici?&sici=0018-2168%28196608%2946%3A3%3C254%3ARRARBT%3E2.0.CO%3B2-0). Accessed 5 January 2005. Tambs provides a detailed account of Bolivian, Brazilian and Peruvian interests and encroachments into Acre and the various attempts made to resolve the issue.

<sup>36</sup>J. Valerie Fifer, *Bolivia: Land, Location and Politics since 1825* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1972), 120-129. The Acre region was rich in rubber resources and, despite being located within Bolivia's boundaries, had been settled by Brazilians. Attempts to settle the boundary dispute failed, and Brazil's settlers declared their independence. When Bolivia threatened to intervene militarily, Brazil heeded the call of its Texas and took control of the area with its military. In 1903, Bolivia ceded over 70,000 square miles of territory to Brazil.

their ability to sustain themselves by the mid 1950s. It examines the rise of indigenous power in relationship to domestic actors, the penetration of the international socialist awakening spawned in the 1920s, and how indigenous (now peasant) organizations became more complex during this period as new domestic actors emerged.

While the creation of this base could not ensure that the Indian's were on even footing with other agents in Bolivia, it did ensure that indigenous movements could not be ignored. Indigenous power continued, somewhat, to rely on alliances with disaffected elites. However, after 1953, even if indigenous power plays failed, the movement still possessed significant strength to continue their efforts.

The structures of indigenous organizations remained heavily tribal and hierarchical; the difference during this period is that the indigenous populations involved in mining and those involved in agriculture began to develop closer ties. In fact, at the beginning of this period, miner organizations actually took rural peasant groups under their wing. However, these ties were not necessarily enduring. By the end of this revolution, these rural organizations had begun to stand on their own. The development of Bolivia's infrastructure, especially roads and railroads, improved their ability to move resources, information and ideas between urban and rural areas. Indigenous groups began to consolidate themselves in local urban areas through unions and in rural areas through ethnic-based communal organizations. These cells would become the basis for larger indigenous movements that developed in the closing decades of the twentieth century.

## **B. ACTORS AND INTERESTS**

### **1. Mining Elite**

Having gained momentum in the late 1800s, the mining elite continued their efforts towards privatization. They continued to seek out international buyers for silver and tin, and they favored policies that would ensure a steady supply of labor. To ensure the latter, mine owners favored the expansion of the *hacienda* system. Because *haciendas* required less labor than communal lands, in theory it would free up Indian labor that could be transferred to cities and mining towns. *Haciendas* also used lands more efficiently than traditional communities, which was critical to Bolivia's move towards a liberal economy.

To support the former, the mining industry sought foreign investors to develop Bolivia's infrastructure and transportation networks. Railroads were developed with the aid of foreign assistance, connecting central and southern Bolivia, and Arica on the Chilean coast. However, the lack of transportation lines into the southeastern frontier limited the effectiveness of the state, and it contributed to Bolivia's failure in the Chaco War. An excerpt from Bruce Farcau's book on the Chaco war provides a vivid description of the geographical challenges to the development of Bolivia's transportation network:

The real weakness of the Bolivian Army in the Chaco War was actually a function of geography. A Bolivian soldier traveling from La Paz to the front first covered more than four hundred miles by train to the railhead at Villazon. He then traveled by truck or foot two hundred miles to the supply center at Ville Montes. At the outbreak of the war a soldier still had another 250 miles or more to cover to reach the front at Boqueron, usually by foot over dirt tracks. This was the route followed by every man, gun, and bullet that Bolivia used during the war.<sup>37</sup>

Even as late as 1950, suitable transportation links had yet to be developed as far east as Santa Cruz de la Sierra.

By the turn of the century, the decline of world silver trade had a direct effect on Bolivia's power structure. Demands for tin supplanted that for silver, but silver miners were unable to transition their operations as rapidly as the emerging class of upstart tin miners. Unlike their predecessors, the new class of tin miners chose initially to stay out of politics, and instead allowed their affairs and their relationship with the state to be handled by emerging urban professionals (*roscas*). In fact, many of these mine owners did not even reside in Bolivia, instead practicing a form of "absentee capitalism."<sup>38</sup>

By the mid 1950s, the mining elite would lose its firm grip over the nation. Rivalry among these elites, combined with competition with the military and the new Left, severely weakened the mining monopoly. This class was further undermined by the

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<sup>37</sup>Bruce W. Farcau, *The Chaco War: Bolivia and Paraguay, 1932-1935* (Westport, CT and London: Praeger, 1996), 20.

<sup>38</sup>Catherine M. Canaghan and James M. Malloy, *Unsettling Statecraft: Democracy and Neoliberalism in the Central Andes* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1994), 25.

growing social and political consciousness, and more importantly, organizational efforts, of miners and urban labor.

## 2. The State

During this period, the state began to develop greater intellectual and institutional cleavages along liberal and conservative lines. The conservatives remained tied to Potosí and a liberal, privatized economy that still based on “the extraction of its natural resources.” The conservative’s case for privatizing Bolivia’s indigenous population was two-fold. First, Bolivia needed to stabilize its labor force, which meant extending the control of the state into indigenous communities to ensure that Indians were not only available to market their labor, but also properly trained to meet the requirements of Bolivia’s industry. To that extent, efforts were undertaken by the state to develop them into a class that maximized production without necessarily developing into a political force.<sup>39</sup>

The second intent was to strengthen the state’s control over the indigenous population by assimilating them and abandoning their “backwards ways.”<sup>40</sup> Having changed the formal status of indigenous peoples from “*Indio*” to *campesino* (peasant), the state attempted to undermine the legitimacy of their claims for land based on historic or traditional grounds. Instead, the new *campesino* citizens were forced to compete for their interests within a legal framework that favored wealthy, land-owning citizens. Also, because the Indians were now official citizens, they lost their special status and could be dealt with to the full extent of state law. This is similar to United States Government’s treatment of North American Indians during the 1800s.<sup>41</sup> By conferring upon the Indians the status of United States citizen, it provided a legal justification for the state to abandon the previous conventions that granted special rights to members of other nations.

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<sup>39</sup>Brooke Larson provides a thorough account of the curricula debate in “Capturing Indian Bodies, Hearts and Minds: The Gendered Politics of Rural School Reform in Bolivia, 1910-1952,” Merilee S. Grindle and Pilar Domingo, eds., *Proclaiming Revolution: Bolivia in Comparative Perspective* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003), 188.

<sup>40</sup>Juliana Strobel-Gregor, Bert Hoffman and Andrew Holmes, “From Indio to Mestizo...to Indio: New Indianist Movements in Bolivia,” *Latin American Perspectives*, vol. 21, no. 2, Social Movements and Political Change in Latin America: 1 (Spring 1994): 108. Available from JSOTR. [Http://links.jstor.org/sici?&sici=0094-582X%28199421%2921%3A2%3C106%3AFITMIN%3E2.0.CO%3B2-W](http://links.jstor.org/sici?&sici=0094-582X%28199421%2921%3A2%3C106%3AFITMIN%3E2.0.CO%3B2-W). Accessed 5 January 2005.

<sup>41</sup>Robert Wooster, *The Military and United States Indian Policy, 1865-1903* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1988), 9.

### **3. Shades of the Left**

Liberals were essentially the non-mining elite, and they held a different view on how Bolivia should be developed. Unlike the conservatives centered around the silver of Potosí, liberals were more closely tied to La Paz (and tin mining), which during the nineteenth century had become a great trading crossroads for agriculture, natural resources and ideas. The liberals sought to displace the mining elite by nationalizing the mines, and by developing Bolivia's government into a federal system. However, they proved to be closer to conservatives than the liberals that had developed between the 1920s and mid-1930s. In fact, the liberal identity was more anti-mining establishment than they were pro-socialist. As Irurozqui points out:

Far from representing different economic interests, the Bolivian political parties were, like their opponents, the expression of elite control of the political system. The party lines did not correspond with social or professional divisions, nor, in the strict sense, with ideological ones.... Beneath the variations and substantive differences between conservatives and liberals lay a similar culture, a set of practices and conceptions that shaped the collective imagination of the privileged group...ensuring the cohesion of the elite.<sup>42</sup>

The new Left appeared more akin to traditional European socialist organizations. Their socialist inclinations were fed by the consequences of the Great Depression and the miserable performance of Bolivia's generals in the Chaco War. All were reinforced by the rise in socialist thought that caught fire in Europe during the early 1900s. With respect to the Indians, the new Left favored a return to their original *Indio* status and the creation of unions to protect the common laborer (in this case, the miners).

The economic failure experienced under liberal leadership following the movement of the capital to La Paz resulted in a Republican takeover in 1920. This group was comprised mostly of those conservatives who had lost power in 1899. However, somewhat ironically, the rise of socialist thought coincided with the Left's return to power. It was under a conservative regime that elites started to question traditional relationships with labor and the indigenous population. Thus, the indigenous population

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<sup>42</sup>Marta Irurozqui, "Political Leadership and Popular Contest: Party Strategies in Bolivia, 1880-1899," *The Americas*, vol. 53, no. 3 (January 1997): 399-400. Available from JSOTR. [Http://links.jstor.org/sic\\_i?sci=0003-1615%28199701%2953%3A3%3C395%3APLAPCP%3E2.0.CO%3B2-X](http://links.jstor.org/sic_i?sci=0003-1615%28199701%2953%3A3%3C395%3APLAPCP%3E2.0.CO%3B2-X). Accessed 5 January 2005.

began to regain its voice in the arms of a regime that had suppressed it two decades earlier.

#### **4. The Army**

Seeing the need to professionalize its military and put an end to *caudillism*, Bolivia sought military expertise from Germany in 1911.<sup>43</sup> In this case, professionalization meant the subordination of the army to the extent that it did not respond to elites' efforts to overthrow one another. However, as has often been the case in Latin America, it did retain the image as an institution that could restore order and governance when civilian political mechanisms proved incapable. Also, the state did not hesitate to use the military to quell Indian rebellions. The most notable rebellion was that in Chayanta in 1927. Indians forced the *latifundistas* from their lands when they failed to address Indian grievances. The army was dispatched to restore order, and they subsequently dispatched over one hundred Indians.

The turning point for the Army was the Chaco War, and it produced an army that was split into two camps. Conservatives favored the old order, which included minimal government interference and sufficient resources to support their adventures. In direct opposition to the old ways were Bolivia's "Young Turks." These were junior officers who suffered from the incompetence of Bolivia's general staff during the war. They felt betrayed by a corps of general officers that had not provided the resources necessary to defeat Paraguay, and that had looked on the sufferings of the army with indifference. (Senior, conservative officers stood aside when the Young Turks came to power, fearing reprisals for their poor war performance if they favored the old establishment.) These junior officers who were disillusioned by the Chaco war also came to oppose the mining elites. The common hardships endured by these officers and their largely indigenous troops led them to align with the Left, which included favoring a return of indigenous rights after the war. In this case, the preference was for Indian group rights instead of the rights of the individual citizen.

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<sup>43</sup>A Bolivian graduate of the *Ecole de Guerre* established the country's first military academy. Bolivia also received French assistance in organizing its General Staff in 1905. A detailed account of the development and professionalization of Bolivia's military can be found in: Charles D. Corbett, "Military Institutional Development and Sociopolitical Change: The Bolivian Case," *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs*, vol. 14, no. 4, Special Issue: Military and Reform Governments in Latin America (November 1972): 402-403. Available online from JSOTR. [Http://links.jstor.org/sici?&sici=0022-1937%28197211%2914%3A4%3C399%3AMIDASC%3E2.0.CO%3B2-B](http://links.jstor.org/sici?&sici=0022-1937%28197211%2914%3A4%3C399%3AMIDASC%3E2.0.CO%3B2-B). Accessed 5 January 2005.

In 1934, disenchantment with the state, the mining elite and a failed liberal economy culminated in the arrest of President Daniel Salamanca by the army. Salamanca went to the Chaco front intending to take charge of the army. After a brief interlude with liberal party leader Tejada Sorzano at the helm, control of the government was passed to the military in 1936. The military ruled Bolivia for the next four years under Colonel David Toro and German Busch. Based on their experiences, and influenced by a rise in socialist thought, each leader responded with a form of military-socialism.

The military had conflicting effects on Bolivia's indigenous population. The significance of these effects were three-fold. First, resentment developed among Indian troops as a result of their use to suppress Indians uprisings. Second, and paradoxically, military service would eventually become a form of validation within Indian communities. The status of males within Indian communities, and more importantly the opportunities available to them, are directly tied to obtaining a certificate of military service.<sup>44</sup> Third, military training, while providing Indians with a sense of nationalism and citizenship, also provided military and organizational training that could be used to undermine the state. All three factors would gain significance in the years to come as indigenous communities consolidated their control over Bolivia's rural areas.

## 5. Indians

At the beginning of 1900s, the groupings and interests of the indigenous population were similar to those of the previous century. Both endured extreme hardship and exploitation. These conditions were now compounded by the loss of their semi-protected indigenous status. Miners continued to seek better pay and working conditions, and the *campesinos* sought a return to self-governance and communal land ownership. The expansion of land privatization and resulting *campesino* migration towards the cities or other rural areas generated social and financial friction among the indigenous population.

While significant improvements were not made towards indigenous autonomy, Quechua and Aymara leader met in La Paz in 1945 to hold the first Indian Congress. This was possible due to a weak state and the need for the MNR to expand and strengthen

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<sup>44</sup>Lesley Gill, *Teetering on the Rim: Global Restructuring, Daily Life, and the Armed Retreat of the Bolivian State* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000), 118.

its constituency. Indian leaders made their traditional demands. Although none of their demands were realized by the state, the fact that elites allowed the Congress to convene reinforces the nature of indigenous groups as sources of power.

## C. GROUPINGS

### 1. The Left

Natural allies came together during this period and included liberals, socialists, and like-minded university students. Given the rise of socialist thought generated in the 1920s and reinforced by the Great Depression in the 1930s, the first major opposition to conservative thought developed, towards which Bolivia's indigenous labor force gravitated.

Interests supported by the Left included a return to the legal recognition of peasant communities, and labor and women's rights. These ideas had already taken seed in Peru among Marxist intellectuals, and their influence had begun to migrate to Bolivia.<sup>45</sup> The effects of Peruvian insurgencies on Bolivian opinion would become a recurring theme in Bolivia's recent history. This would be exemplified by Bolivia's cautious approach to insurgency towards the end of the twentieth century based on Peru's experience with the *Movimiento Revolucionario Tupac Amaru* and *Sendero Luminoso*.

As demonstrated by Wickham-Crowley in later times, the political parties that emerged in Bolivia during this time were, despite the economic status of their constituencies, all led by intellectuals. The parties differed along radical and moderate lines. The MNR were national socialists who represented the moderate position. To their Left were the Trotskyites, who strove to end personal service obligation and organize peasants into workers unions. On the radical Left stood the *Partido de la Izquierda Revolucionario* (PIR). Its members sought to liberate the Indians and to nationalize Bolivia's mines. While the PIR was the strongest initially, it was the MNR that carried the day in the 1952 rebellion.

For the Indian population, the rise of the Left was both a source of strength and weakness. It was a mechanism of strength because, for the first time, a portion of

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<sup>45</sup>Herbert S. Klein, *A Concise History of Bolivia* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 165-166.

Bolivia's elites had begun to champion indigenous causes as a part of their larger interests. However, the emergence of multiple parties on the Left provided different options that appealed to different indigenous populations. This had the effect of pulling some indigenous groups apart based on differing attitudes towards government.

The first unified act of this core was the forced move of Bolivia's capital from Sucre to La Paz in 1899. In support of the Left, Indians coordinated strikes in three major cities: La Paz, Oruro and Cochabamba, the latter of which had been emerging as Bolivia's power center east of the Andes. In the end, the Indians gained little from their support of the federalist movement. Promises to restore Indian rights and communal lands were quickly lost on the Left, who actually reinforced conservative policies towards the Indians once they had consolidated power in the new capital. It was not until the military and the new Left took control of the state at the end of the Chaco War that the indigenous population would be in a position to enforce the demands they made in return for their support.

Despite this natural affinity, it took time for MNR planning to mature with respect to the Indian population. In 1949, the MNR attempted to seize power through a series of urban uprisings, yet they were soundly defeated. Planning for the uprising revealed the MNR's uncertainty as to how the peasant population would react.<sup>46</sup> Therefore, Indians were not called upon to support the coup attempt. In 1952, the MNR would not make this same mistake. While the 1952 rebellion was primarily an urban affair, the peasants rapidly took control of the countryside. The MNR took control of the major cities, but their influence extended into rural areas at the pleasure of the Indians.<sup>47</sup>

## 2. The Right

On the Right, conservatives, the traditional military elite and mine owners remained closely aligned. These groups developed close ties with the United States and

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<sup>46</sup>James V. Kohl, "Peasant and Revolution in Bolivia, April 9, 1952—August 2, 1953," *The Hispanic American Historical Review*, vol. 58, no. 2 (May 1978): 239. Available from JSOTR. [Http://links.jstor.org/g/sici?sicid=0018-2168%28197805%2958%3A2%3C238%3APA\\_RIBA%3E2.0.CO%3B2-9](http://links.jstor.org/g/sici?sicid=0018-2168%28197805%2958%3A2%3C238%3APA_RIBA%3E2.0.CO%3B2-9). Accessed 5 January 2005.

<sup>47</sup>*Ibid.*, 239. Evidence demonstrating the extent of indigenous participation in the actual revolt (9-11 April 1952) has been disputed. Kohl cites Richard Patch, Dwight Heath and David Greene. Patch and Heath argue that Indian participation was minimal and not decisive during these three days. Greene argues the opposite. The authors in *Proclaiming Revolution* treat the revolution in a broader timeframe, and do not address the extent of indigenous participation during those three days in April.

Western Europe, both of which were interested in Bolivia's silver and tin. In addition to economic interests, the United States developed political security interests in Bolivia.

The first concern was over the development of fascism in the 1930s and '40s. In the 1950s, this concern shifted with the rise communism.

By the 1950s, different groups had individually usurped the groups of the Right. Silver mine owners were replaced by tin barons. Junior military officers who fought in the Chaco War replaced their seniors, but their views were quite different from those held by their seniors. Within the government, political parties of the Right and the original liberals were replaced by a combination of the new Left and a socialist leaning military.

#### **D. DECISION-MAKING STRUCTURES**

Two structures shaped decision-making during this period for the Indian population. The first was the formal, legal structure, which ultimately provided them little recourse. Having been stripped of their special status as Indian nations, the legal system conferred its favor upon those with capital: large landholders, mine owners, the military and the state. Having lost the voice they previously had with the Spanish colonial government, Indians resorted to violence and localized rebellion. As mentioned above, the most prominent example of this was the Chantaya rebellion of 1927. Miners rebelled after mine owners and the state failed to address their concerns. The army quashed the rebellion, leaving over one hundred Indians dead.

The second decision-making structure was less formal, and was based upon the reciprocal benefits agreed to during the formation of alliances. In return for supporting the liberals' aspirations to displace the Right, the Indians were promised the return of their special status, communal lands, self-governance, and greater access to state resources. Despite this alliance, the Indians did not necessarily possess the strength to enforce the terms of these alliances. As also described in the previous section, the liberals defected from its alliance with the Indians following the successful establishment of Bolivia's capital in La Paz in 1899. In this case, the Indians were placed in an even worse position than before because the one elite political ally that had given them voice had now turned on them. However, in 1953 the indigenous population, now well armed

and in control of the countryside, was in a better position to help ensure outcomes more favorable to their interests.

#### E. OUTCOMES

The aftermath of the 1952 revolution solidified the position of the indigenous population as a force that could no longer be easily suppressed. The government itself undertook limited socialist reforms, but stopped short for fear of being labeled a communist regime; its leaders had observed Guatemala and headed its lessons. In return for this approach, Bolivia was rewarded with a generous aid package from the United States. However, this support was not necessarily realized in rural indigenous communities, and Indian communities turned inwards to focus on reestablishing Traditional Communal Organizations (TCO) for self-governance. TCOs would eventually develop into political units or *sindicatos*, and they also developed militant cells.

Some of the first actions undertaken by the new government had immediate legal implications for the indigenous population. First, all citizens, including the Indians, were granted suffrage. This was not immediately responsive to Indian interests because the state was preoccupied with the immediate task of reconstructing a central government.

Second, the state enacted the Agrarian Reform Act in 1953, which returned communal lands to the indigenous population.<sup>48</sup> This act was more a measure of good housekeeping because Indians had already begun to seize rural lands in 1952. In fact, the MNR had intended to pursue agricultural capitalism, but was prevented by the strength of the peasant control of the countryside.<sup>49</sup> However, this was not the case throughout Bolivia. Land ownership followed different patterns throughout the country. The destruction of the *hacienda* system and the return of communal lands had the most significant impact in Western Bolivia, because that was where the sharpest economic and cultural differences between Indian and *hacendado* existed.

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<sup>48</sup>Richard Patch, “Bolivia: The Restrained Revolution,” *The Annals of the American Academy of Political Science*, no. 334 (March 1961): 128. Available from JSOTR. [Http://links.jstor.org/sici?doi=0002-7162%28196103%29334%3C123%3ABTRR%3E2.0.CO%3B2-Y](http://links.jstor.org/sici?doi=0002-7162%28196103%29334%3C123%3ABTRR%3E2.0.CO%3B2-Y). Accessed 5 January 2005.

<sup>49</sup>Susan Eckstein, “Transformation of a ‘Revolution from Below’—Bolivia and International Capital,” *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, vol. 24, no. 1 (January 1983): 106-107. Available from JSOTR. [Http://links.jstor.org/sici?doi=0010-4175%28198301%2925%3A1%3C105%3ATOA%22FB%3E2.0.CO%3B2-Q](http://links.jstor.org/sici?doi=0010-4175%28198301%2925%3A1%3C105%3ATOA%22FB%3E2.0.CO%3B2-Q). Accessed 5 January 2005.

In the Chapare of the Cochabamba valley, *haciendas* had already begun to decline due to the loss of Altiplano markets, ecological stress, and the division of lands for purposes of inheritance. Completion of the railroad connecting Bolivia with Peru in the vicinity of Lake Titicaca reduced La Paz's economic reliance on the Cochabamba Valley.<sup>50</sup> Landowners increasingly parceled out their lands and sold off sections to peasants in order to service accumulated debts.<sup>51</sup> In eastern Bolivia, where state penetration was the weakest, *haciendas* were not abolished. The decision not to change the structure in the east was a combination of productivity of the land and sparse settlement.

In Bolivia's urban areas and mining towns, Indians would continue to strengthen their labor unions in the pursuit of workers rights and benefits. Based on their proximity to apparati of the state, these labor unions had provided guidance for the rest of the indigenous population. This changed after 1952. The loose ties between urban and rural groups weakened as the peasants began to develop into a force of their own. Ethnic ties were overtaken by local, industry-specific economic and political interests.<sup>52</sup>

Rural and urban ties were further weakened by the MNR's creation of the *Central Obrera Boliviana* (COB) in 1953. COB was created by MNR to take control of Bolivia's labor unions. This included the *Federacion Sindical de Trabajadores Mineros de Bolivia* (FSTMB), which had been allowed to develop during the 1940s. While this brought miners closer to the state in terms of voice, it also subordinated their autonomy.

#### **F. THE NETWORK AND CAPACITY**

Structural trends during this period are similar to those of earlier eras. The ability of indigenous groups to consolidate their power base had once again resulted from ties with minority elites. Despite the limited social reforms of the MNR, Indians were once

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<sup>50</sup>Erwin P. Grieshaber, "Survival of Indian Communities in Nineteenth-Century Bolivia," *Journal of Latin American Studies*, vol. 12. no. 2 (November 1980): 237. Available from JSOTR. [Http://links.jstor.org/sici?&sici=0022-216X%28198011%2912%3A2%3C223%3ASOICIN%3E2.0.CO%3B2-Y](http://links.jstor.org/sici?&sici=0022-216X%28198011%2912%3A2%3C223%3ASOICIN%3E2.0.CO%3B2-Y). Accessed 5 January 2005.

<sup>51</sup>Robert H. Jackson, "The Decline of the Hacienda in Cochabamba, Bolivia: The Case of the Sacaba Valley, 1870-1929," *The Hispanic American Historical Review*, vol. 69, no. 2 (May 1989): 259-281. Available from JSOTR. [Http://links.jstor.org/sici?&sici=0018-2168%28198905%2969%3A2%3C259%3ATDOTH%3E2.0.CO%3B2-W](http://links.jstor.org/sici?&sici=0018-2168%28198905%2969%3A2%3C259%3ATDOTH%3E2.0.CO%3B2-W). Accessed 5 January 2005.

<sup>52</sup>Herbert S. Klein, *A Concise History of Bolivia* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 215.

again in a position, albeit weak, to deal with the state in a legal capacity (in a way that was similar to their relationship to the Crown during the eighteenth century). The difference between this period and previous eras was that conditions now favored the development of ethnic insurgency. The state was weak and could not meet the needs of the indigenous population. Peasants controlled rural area, they had begun developing their own forms of governance absent the state, and they were well armed.

The expansion of indigenous networks was still a few decades off (see Figure 3). As mentioned in the previous section, the reemergence of rural ethnic organizations following the revolution created a gap between urban and rural indigenous groups. However, the resultant inward focus of these groups enabled them to strengthen the local institutions that would later form the basis for more powerful indigenous coalitions.<sup>53</sup> This fragmentation satisfied the first condition of Gerlach and Hine's model because these pockets of strength were segmentary.<sup>54</sup>




Figure 3. Networks and Relationships Towards Revolution

<sup>53</sup>Deborah J. Yashar, "Democracy, Indigenous Movements and the Postliberal Challenge in Latin America," *World Politics*, vol. 52, no. 1 (1999): 81. Available from Project MUSE. [Http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/wp/v052/52.1yashar.html](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/wp/v052/52.1yashar.html). Accessed 5 January 2005.

<sup>54</sup>See Gerlach and Hine's "SPINS" criteria from Chapter I.

Indigenous movements during this time were not yet polycephalous. Although different unions began to emerge, it was still too soon for true leaders to develop who could coordinate their efforts in support of an overall movement. It was not until the 1970s, as unions expanded, fractured and matured, that multiple autonomous leaders who could carry a collective message would emerge.

The groups were also not yet networked together, but improvements to communication infrastructure continued. Road, airfield and rail construction continued to connect rural and urban areas. These physical links would enhance the transmission of resources and information, which would culminate with Bolivia's telecommunications explosion in the late 1990s.

Linkage of indigenous groups to international organizations had not yet begun in this period. However, efforts led by the United States to buttress the MNR government in order to prevent the rise of a communist regime helped bring Bolivia attention to the world community, Western Europe specifically. The expansion of foreign-sponsored domestic aid and development programs would slowly bring indigenous interests to the attention of the world in the following decades. Thus, the foundation had been laid and the mold had set for the domestic and international rise of Bolivia's indigenous groups.

## **G. CONCLUSION**

During this period the foundation had been laid for indigenous groups to emerge as significant political and social movements. Indigenous groups would not be capable of directly challenging the state for several decades, but the development of this capacity, as with any organization, is a gradual process. Individuals may share a preference, indigenous interests in this case, but it takes time to identify leadership, establish control and organize people into a body that can exert influence on the state through coherent, collective action. This process can become drawn out as sub-factions fight for control over a group and attempt to reconcile different interests. Two factors characterize this process during this period.

First, structure limited the strategies that the state and indigenous groups could pursue. Because capacity is finite, allocating resources to one program meant that fewer were available for others. The state could only exert so much control in certain areas.

Resources were limited, which meant the state had to make choices about where to consolidate control. During this period, treasure was spent in efforts to improve the infrastructure of Bolivia's major population centers, increase the capacity of the mining industry, and start to push west into its frontiers. The decision to go to war in the Chaco limited the state's ability to consolidate domestic control. The minimal interference of the state in rural indigenous affairs created political space for these groups to continue to strengthen the quality and increase the number of their internal links—to consolidate.

Second, what efforts the state did undertake to incorporate indigenous peoples into Bolivia, and indigenous groups' approaches to integration with the state, represent an interactive process that was iterative. One actor was not in complete control, and it cannot be concluded that one group can be identified as an independent variable. Instead, what this chapter has demonstrated is that the relationship between the state and indigenous groups was one of reciprocal influence. Both actors did not necessarily share the same understanding of their environment. Each had a unique perception of the other and the environment that conditioned their responses and courses of action.

Indigenous groups during this period were still not unified as a movement. Local interests and political structures helped condition the actions and approaches of these groups to government. In the western mining towns and urban centers, indigenous groups drifted towards traditional political parties and unions for representation and pursuit of their interests. In central Bolivia, and especially so in the rural areas, indigenous groups continued to use traditional forms of organization and governance.

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## IV. WHY NOW: HARVESTING THE PAST

### A. INTRODUCTION

Following the 1952 revolution, the new Left remained in power until 1964. During this period, Bolivian politics became paralyzed by strong urban labor and mining unions. Peasant militias, still armed and in control of the countryside since the revolution, degraded government efforts to extend authority throughout the state. During the early 1960s, the armed forces began to regain prominence under President Victor Paz Estensorro. However, in 1964, after being elected to a third term, his coalition collapsed. Paz quickly ceded power to his running mate, General René Barrientos. Military juntas of various flavors would continue to rule Bolivia until 1982, and even included a future elected president, General Hugo Banzer.

The 1980s and 1990s witnessed the rise of Bolivia's indigenous groups to a level where the state could no longer easily control them through violence, cooption, bribery or mere neglect. Today, indigenous groups increasingly place limits on the ability of the state to act. The question that must be asked is, why now? Was the ascendancy of indigenous groups in Bolivia inevitable? If the answer is yes, then the question becomes, why not sooner?

Some might argue that certain flashpoints during this period were responsible for the growing power of indigenous groups: numerous *cocalero* (coca farmer) uprisings in the Chapare, the Cochabamba water war in 2000, annual marches and demonstrations in La Paz and other major cities. While these flashpoints were spectacular events, they alone cannot explain why indigenous groups have become a force. Sufficient resources had to be available, a certain level of organization had to be achieved, and indigenous leaders had to understand the dynamics of their environment in order to realize and act upon real and potential political opportunities. Instead, these flashpoints may be more accurately characterized as what Chalmers Johnson calls "accelerators." An accelerator is:

some ingredient, usually contributed by fortune, that deprives the elite of its chief weapon for enforcing social behavior (e.g., an army mutiny) or that leads a group of revolutionaries to *believe* (original emphasis) that the time to strike is now.<sup>55</sup>

While in this case Johnson is speaking about revolution and insurrection, accelerators can also be related to social movements, which are not necessarily violent. The significance of accelerators is that they are related to currents of underlying conditions that have a momentum beyond the actual spark. Sparks that occur in the absence of underlying conditions may develop into spectacular events such as riots or demonstrations, but they do not result in significant changes in power or social order.

The rise of indigenous groups was not just a matter of elites relaxing control or forming alliances with lower classes. As described in the previous two chapters, this too had happened on previous occasions. Also, it was not just a matter of organization and leadership. As has been demonstrated, indigenous groups have been organized and led by their own since well before the arrival of the Spanish. So the question remains, why now?

This chapter argues that the ascendancy of Bolivia's indigenous groups during the last decades of the twentieth century was the result of their transformation into networked social movements. The transformation provided these groups with resources and tools to increase their ability to organize, coordinate, and communicate (domestically and internationally) in such a way that generated leverage which could be used against the state and its international supporters. This will be demonstrated by examining the alliances formed by indigenous groups based on their interests, their relationships to other actors, the mobilization of organizational and material resources, the framing of issues to generate solidarity among the movement, and the political opportunities recognized by indigenous leaders. The shaping of Bolivia's indigenous social movements by formal and informal decision making structures will be examined, followed by the outcomes of these interactions. The chapter concludes with a description of the networked nature of Bolivia's current indigenous movements.

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<sup>55</sup> Chalmers Johnson, *Revolutionary Change, Second Edition* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1982), 94.

## **B. METHODOLOGY AND SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORY**

Much of the history of Bolivia's indigenous population has occurred outside of formal decisionmaking structures. In order to account for this, three concepts from social mobilization theory will be used because they offer a window into informal, grass roots movements, which are somewhat similar to the development and evolution of Bolivia's indigenous movement. These concepts are "mobilization processes (structure and resource availability), framing resonance, and shifts in opportunity structures."<sup>56</sup>

In the case of mobilization processes, much of the organizing occurred outside of the state and was based on communal or tribal links. These often served local needs, and they were suitable for competing with the viceroyalty or state over contentious issues. The type and timing of resource availability is also critical. While resources were mostly available to indigenous groups for subsistence (although not necessarily at generous levels), resources for communication, legal expertise/education and access to decision makers were not always present.

Framing resonance is significant because not all calls for rebellion are heeded. Rather, some gain more traction than others. Furthermore, different frames, or conceptualizations, may cause action at different times. How an issue is couched is not necessarily transferable among different populations or time periods.

Political opportunity is important because it provides openings for actions that can advance the movement. In the case of the indigenous movements, political opportunity generally results from one of two actions. First is the generation of a mass, coherent group that is able to force its demands on those who control authoritative institutions. The second results from cleavages among groups, usually elites, that provide an opportunity for indigenous groups to ally with powerful minority elites in the pursuit of related causes.

These three attributes help not only identify the organizing and informal decision making structures. They also help identify the resistance, or leveraging, capacity of a

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<sup>56</sup> Quintan Wiktorowicz, *Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2004), 4.

group. The range of collective, contentious actions that characterize an indigenous groups repertoire of collective, exists along a continuum that measures levels of violence. From the least to most violent, these actions are:

1. Peaceful, legal opposition in accordance with law.
2. Peaceful disruptive activities (civil disobedience).
3. Violent disruptive activities (riots, blockades, strikes, *para civicas*).
4. Coup. For this thesis, coups are assumed to involve fewer people and be have a shorter duration than armed revolution.
5. Armed Revolution/Insurgency. This is a protracted activity compared to the coup. It is not limited to violent activity, and may incorporate short periods of violence (e.g., battles and raids) that continue over time.

Three points must be made about characterizing activities using this spectrum. First, these categories are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Groups may pursue their goals through a combination of legal and violent activities. Second is the level of violence or civic disruption associated with the action. Third, in addition to the level of violence commensurate with the each category, the scope of the activity is just as important. Local, isolated actions have less weight than those occurring simultaneously in different cities. These may, in fact, be only riots, and not actual movements.

Movement implies a higher form of organization and includes (generally) planned actions which occur over time. Simultaneous actions also indicate a higher form of organization. Simultaneous actions inspired, led, and carried out solely by ethnic groups have an even higher significance (when compared to action combined with other actors) because they indicate a relatively higher degree of autonomy. It is these actions that most closely mirror an organization that is internally networked. Similar to third wave insurgency, actions take the form of decentralized, collective activities, and various protagonist groups are capable of existing and operating in the absence of a central coordinating authority. It is these characteristics that separate random riots and mobs from true social movements.

## C. HISTORICAL CONTEXT

After the 1952 revolution, the military rule and *caudillism* had been discredited for the time being and retreated from national politics. However, Bolivia reverted to a junta under General Rene Barrientos in 1964.

Most of the 1970s were ruled over by General Hugo Banzer, who came to power as the result of another *coup d'etat*. The coup was supported by big business in eastern Bolivia and formed a conservative base to pursue economic reform. Santa Cruz businessmen were eager to shift Bolivia's economic alliances away from Argentina and towards Brazil, where they saw greater development potential. Land reform during this decade was promoted by Banzer in an effort to shore up support from the peasant classes in central and western Bolivia. However, the fading economic boom at the end of the 1970s loosened the bonds formed between the Bolivia's business class and Banzer.

Two factors that would help strengthen the development of Bolivia's indigenous groups were slowly coming together. At the end of the decade, over half of the population lived in urban centers, and 72% of the population was bilingual.<sup>57</sup> The combination of these two factors supported the development of networks that would facilitate coordination, organization, the exchange of ideas and resources, and the development of networks. Although the organization of the lower classes continued to develop, inter- and intra-class competition of lower and middle class parties, which included urban and rural mixes, had yet to mature during this period to the point of being able to act collectively.

The 1980s witnessed the true beginnings of multi-ethnic democracy, which was a result of political opportunities, the limited reach of the state, and the discontent generated by neoliberal economic shock therapy undertaken in 1985.<sup>58</sup> Bolivia's drug trade was in full motion, which helped keep the state at bay, providing resources and

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<sup>57</sup> Herbert S. Klein, *A Concise History of Bolivia* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 235.

<sup>58</sup> Public Broadcasting Service, "Up for Debate: Shock Therapy: Bolivia, Poland Russia: Same Policies—Different Results," *Commanding Heights* interview with Jeffrey Sachs on 15 June 2000. [Http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/commandingheights/shared/minitextlo/int\\_jeffreysachs.html](http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/commandingheights/shared/minitextlo/int_jeffreysachs.html). Accessed 1 February 2005.

political space for indigenous groups to organize. Outside of the major cities, the state controlled very little.

Already limited in its capacity, the state made some concessions to Bolivia's indigenous population based on its fear that Peru-like insurgencies would develop within its own backyard. It was during this period that the *Movimiento Revolucionario Tupac Katari* (MRTK) was created by those who were dissatisfied with the workers' union *Central Obrera de Bolivia* (COB).<sup>59</sup> This group, unlike other indigenous organizations before it, developed solely for the purpose of indigenous rights. This idea spread eastward and eventually led to ethnicity-based peasant unions and the formation of the umbrella organization *Confederacion Sindical Unica de Colonos Bolivianos* (CSUTCB), marking the formal shift of the indigenous center of gravity from the miners to the peasants. The CSUTCB became the subordinate trade union of the *Katarista* movement.<sup>60</sup>

During the 1990s, Bolivia's indigenous groups continued to establish themselves within the government. In 1993, Bolivia's first indigenous vice president, Victor Hugo Cardenas, was elected. A result of his alliance with the left emerged in the form of the 1994 revisions to the 1967 constitution. These revisions specifically recognized Bolivia's indigenous peoples. This shift in focus towards local politics would bolster the strength of indigenous groups in part by conferring legitimacy on mostly indigenous politics. It also reduced popular visibility on the state's shortcomings, which had heretofore provided opposition groups with numerous ready-made justifications to rally against the state. In 1997, former dictator Hugo Banzer was elected and continued the liberalizing efforts.

In the opening years of the twenty-first century, Bolivia nearly elected its first indigenous president. Indigenous groups played a significant role in the ouster of President Sanchez de Lozada, obtained concessions for the creation of a constituent

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<sup>59</sup> *Kataristas* had existed before this; this was the first time they organized specifically along ethnic lines.

<sup>60</sup> Juliana Strobel-Gregor, "Culture and Political Practice of the Aymara and Quechua in Bolivia: Autonomous Forms of Modernity in the Andes," *Latin American Perspectives*, vol. 23, no. 2 (Spring 1996), 72, 76. Available from JSTOR. [Http://links.jstor.org/sici?&sici=0094-582X%28199621%2923%3A2%3C71%3ACAPPOT%3E2.0.CO%3B2-2](http://links.jstor.org/sici?&sici=0094-582X%28199621%2923%3A2%3C71%3ACAPPOT%3E2.0.CO%3B2-2). Accessed 5 February 2005.

assembly, and have been gradually forcing the nationalization of Bolivia's natural resources. At the time of this writing, President Carlos Mesa serves not just figuratively, but literally, at the pleasure of the people.

The following sections describe the major actors and coalitions that have resulted in the emergence of Bolivia's powerful indigenous groups. These groups have generated unprecedented leverage against the state.

#### **D. ACTORS, INTERESTS AND FRAMES**

##### **1. Government and Interests**

The various regimes and administrations that ruled Bolivia during the last of half of the twentieth century all sought to expand Bolivia's infrastructure and economy. What differed among them were the ideas about how development should proceed. The relative success of Bolivia's economic reforms and coca eradication programs in the 1980s and 90s made it the model for Western economic reform and development in South America. Having created a stable base, the ability for Bolivia to expand its economy would be directly related to its ability to expand the capacity of state services and improve the quality and quantity of indigenous representation in government.

President Banzer's successful strengthening of the state declined with his health in the 2001. Banzer was succeeded by his vice president, Jorge Quiroga, who ruled by constitutional appointment until his defeat by Gonzalo "Goni" Sanchez de Lozada in 2002. As finance minister, Goni had presided over the economic shock therapy administered in 1985, and later served as Bolivia's president from 1993-1997. Early in his second administration, he attempted to continue development along the neoliberal model. He began to establish measures to privatize Bolivia's emerging natural gas industry, which sparked eleven months of intermittent riots and violence, and ultimately led to his resignation in 2003.

##### **2. United States**

United States foreign policy towards Bolivia had been underpinned by interests in a cheap and steady supply of natural resources, and also a concern for the prevention of the expansion of communist regimes in the region up through the 1980s. Bolivia's role as a major coca base provider in the 1980s led to a shift in U.S. foreign policy, which tied

economic aid and development programs to counterdrug programs. These programs focused on a mix of eradication, interdiction, education, and alternative development.<sup>61</sup> This was reinforced with law enforcement training programs to improve police investigative procedures, and revisions to the criminal code aimed at reducing corruption.<sup>62</sup>

As a result of Bolivia's successes, the growing insurgency in Colombia, and the United States' global campaign against Islamist insurgency, the U.S. reduced its financial support to Bolivia. Illicit drugs remained a low priority, and the primary U.S. interest in Bolivia was to support stable, democratic governance. For example, in 2002 U.S. Ambassador to Bolivia Manuel Rocha publicly expressed his opposition to the potential election of Evo Morales<sup>63</sup>, whom he considered to be a radical, to the presidency.<sup>64</sup> Morales ultimately lost the election by a slim margin to Sanchez de Lozada.

### **3. Indigenous Groups**

The rise of indigenous power in the last half of the twentieth century is often described as the emerging heyday of Bolivia's indigenous movement. Although it was markedly stronger during this period, it is premature and artificial to understand Bolivia's indigenous organizations as a unitary group.<sup>65</sup> As James C. Scott concludes in his work on revolutions, the true nature of revolution or opposition parties can be more precisely understood if they are seen as groups—with some shared interests—that build alliances

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<sup>61</sup> Interdiction campaigns included Operations Blast Furnace (1986), Snowcap (1987), Gatekeeper, and *GRIRMO* (1988). The Andean Regional Initiative (2001), later known as the Andean Counternarcotics Initiative, tied development funding to counternarcotics programs, democratic institution building, human rights development.

<sup>62</sup> Author's comment based on experience while posted to AMEMB Bolivia. Efforts to reform the Bolivian National Police were undertaken as part of Justice Department' International Criminal Investigative Training and Assistance Program.

<sup>63</sup> Former Senator Evo Morales is the leader of both the *cocaleros* and the *Movimiento al Socialismo*.

<sup>64</sup>"Bolivian Electoral Court Rejects Comments by U.S. Ambassador Rocha," *Los Tiempos* (Cochabamba), 28 June 2002. Translated by FBIS. Accessed 5 January 2005.

<sup>65</sup> Christine McKee provides a thorough, concise description of Bolivia's indigenous groups and their relationships to one another, and local state government in, "The Campaign for an Instrumento Politico: The Latest Developments in the Indigenous Movement in Bolivia." Paper presented to the Society for Latin American Studies—Postgraduates in Latin Americas Studies 1999 Conference; The Graduate Institute; University of Hull; Hull, England (4-5 December 1999), 4. [Http://www.uea.ac.uk/dev/pilas/McKee1.pdf](http://www.uea.ac.uk/dev/pilas/McKee1.pdf). Accessed 5 February 2005.

upon one another to achieve specific goals.<sup>66</sup> This understanding reinforces the idea that explaining outcomes using the political economy method is not just about resulting policy, but also about what happens to the relationships and alliances that were initially formed around specific interests. Closer scrutiny reveals the existence of numerous groups with different interests, perceptions of identity, and approaches to dealing with the state.

Mining and urban workers immediately formed unions under the broad banner of the COB following the 1952 revolution, but rural Indians continued to remain outside the state fold. As described in the previous chapter, an armed rural peasantry, combined with the weakness of the state, enabled indigenous groups to continue practicing local governance and communal land use. The urban—rural divide was exacerbated by Quechua and Aymara leaders who, because of their dissatisfaction with the established political parties and differences with the COB, broke away during the 1970s to form their own interest groups.

In the face of the waning mining industry in the 1980s, the Government of Bolivia reduced the scale of the state-directed mining concern, *Corporacion Minera de Bolivia*, in favor of agriculture. Over twenty thousand miners—three quarters of the mining workforce—were let go, and they migrated to both urban and rural areas.<sup>67</sup> This immediately reduced the importance of mining unions and thrust the rural peasant groups to the forefront of indigenous opposition politics. Within the cities, the CSUTCB replaced miners as the dominant group within the COB.

Infighting among the remaining mining unions also contributed to the shift of power towards the peasant groups. At the beginning of this period, miner-based opposition groups framed their contention in terms of class conflict. This was a product of previous ties with the Left, and gained prominence because of the proximity of mining groups to centers of state power (Sucre and La Paz). Bolivia's rural indigenous population framed its struggle in terms of indigenous identity. No longer were assaults

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<sup>66</sup> James C. Scott, “Revolution in the Revolution: Peasants and Commissars,” Michael Taylor, ed., *Rationality and Revolution* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 98.

<sup>67</sup> Herbert S. Klein, *A Concise History of Bolivia* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 245.

on the indigenous population by the state purely economic; rather, they became attacks on the very foundation of indigenous culture and heritage. This image was used to reinforce arguments against neo-colonialism and economic liberalization.

Bringing indigenous groups together got off to a slow start. In 1992, ethnic groups from throughout Bolivia descended on La Paz to hold the first “National Assembly of Peoples.” The purpose of the assembly was to reach a consensus on indigenous goals and agree upon a plan to pursue them. However, the assembly failed. Suspicion and distrust of one another among the groups prevented them from finalizing any resolutions and presenting a unified front.<sup>68</sup>

In the midst of this ethnic resurgence, greater emphasis was placed on the cultural importance of coca. While it had always been used in traditional religious ceremonies, as well as for reducing the physical effects of hunger, high altitude and exhausting work such as mining, indigenous groups began to re-emphasize its sacred significance. Where once coca eradication had jeopardized only the livelihoods of those who relied on its cultivation and trade, it now was now framed as an assault on a specific people and their historical identity. These frame shifts allowed Bolivia’s indigenous groups to present an image with which international audiences could more easily sympathize. In addition to coca, indigenous groups adopted other symbols to represent solidarity. One was the *wiphala*, the rainbow-colored flag representing the Aymara kingdom. The *wiphala* is displayed in shops and houses, and en masse at demonstrations. Others included the appropriation of the bowler by the lower classes, which previously had been a symbol of upward class mobility.

Despite the success of peasant unions, they failed to capture the support of all of Bolivia’s indigenous groups. Just how groups would be represented continued to be a divisive issue; the CSUTCB tended to view differences in terms of *indigena* and *blanco*, and it assumed that all *indigenas* shared similar interests. Could a majority peasant group adequately represent minority indigenous groups that saw differences among ethnicities? And, could it represent indigenous groups that were not associated with, or interested in,

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<sup>68</sup> Xavier Albo, “Making the Leap from Local Mobilization to National Politics,” *NACLA Report on the Americas* (March-April 1996), 2. [Http://www.hartford-hwp.com/archives/41/201.html](http://www.hartford-hwp.com/archives/41/201.html). Accessed 5 February 2005.

traditional labor unions.<sup>69</sup> How could ethnic peasant organizations that recognized the authority of the state represent those who refused to identify themselves as citizens?

The Indians of Bolivia's eastern lowlands continued to remain removed from the state, as well as other domestic indigenous movements. The CSUTCB failed in its attempt to bring the eastern Indians into the union because<sup>70</sup> the latter realized that they would always be a minority group within the CSUTCB.<sup>71</sup> Eastern Indians were not interested in integration into the state, and instead preferred to operate outside the CSUTCB and to limit their goals to local autonomy and dignity issues.<sup>72</sup> However, the lessons of strength derived from presenting an organized and unified front were not lost on the eastern peoples. They created their own indigenous groups—*Confederacion Indigena del Oriente Boliviano* (CIDOB), *Central de Pueblos Indigenas del Beni* (CPDB), and *Asamblea del Pueblo Guarani* (APG)—to represent their interests and remain separate from traditional political parties, or indigenous groups tightly aligned with these political parties.

#### **4. Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO) and International Interest Groups**

Hundreds of domestic and international NGOs operate in Bolivia.<sup>73</sup> NGOs began to emerge in Bolivia in the 1960s, however, they did not begin to gain traction for nearly thirty years. The right-leaning state and left-leaning NGOs (which comprised the majority) had generally opposed one another for influence in Bolivia. Government corruption tied to left-wing NGOs paved the way for neoliberal NGOs (e.g., USAID) to

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<sup>69</sup> Dwight R. Hahn, "The Use and Abuse of Ethnicity: The Case of the Bolivian CSUTCB," *Latin American Perspectives*, vol. 22, no. 2 Ethnicity and Class in Latin America (Spring, 1996), 101-102. Available from JSTOR. [Http://links.jstor.org/sici?&sici=0094-582X%28199621%2923%3A2%3C91%3ATUAA%OE%3E2.0.CO%3B2-P](http://links.jstor.org/sici?&sici=0094-582X%28199621%2923%3A2%3C91%3ATUAA%OE%3E2.0.CO%3B2-P). Accessed 5 February 2005.

<sup>70</sup> *Ibid.*, 98.

<sup>71</sup> *Ibid.*, 115.

<sup>72</sup> Juliana-Strobel-Gregor, Bert Hoffman and Andrew Holmes, "From Indio to Mestizo...to Indio: New Indianist Movements in Bolivia," *Latin American Perspectives*, vol. 21, no. 2 Social Movements and Political Change in Latin America: 1 (Spring, 1994), 117-118. Available from JSTOR. [Http:// links.jstor.org/sici?&sici=0094-82X%28199421%2921%3A2%3C106%3AFITMIN%3E2.0.CO%3B2-W](http://links.jstor.org/sici?&sici=0094-82X%28199421%2921%3A2%3C106%3AFITMIN%3E2.0.CO%3B2-W). Accessed 5 February 2005.

<sup>73</sup> International Crisis Group, "Bolivia's Divisions: Too Deep to Heal," *ICG Report No.7* (6 July 2004), 10. [Http://www.icg.org/library/documents/latin\\_america/07boliviadivisions.pdf](http://www.icg.org/library/documents/latin_america/07boliviadivisions.pdf). Accessed 5 January 2005.

expand in Bolivia as the people and the state reacted against the Left.<sup>74</sup> The boost that created the nexus of indigenous movements and NGOs came in 1994 when the senate approved Law 1551, the Law of Popular Participation (LPP). This law created a new relationship for accountability and oversight of local areas—mostly those where the state exercised less influence or had weakly penetrated—and it empowered new *organizaciones territorial de base* (Territorial Base Organizations) to deal directly with NGOs. Essentially, the state ceded some of its own authority to organize and develop remote communities directly to NGOs.<sup>75</sup>

NGOs are required to register with the state, and in some cases, the state charters and subsidizes NGOs to provide certain services and specific tasks. However, others are left to pursue their own programs, and their level of accountability of is directly related to their distance from Bolivia's major cities. This is not to suggest that NGOs are operating in contradiction to state interests, only that they are subjected to less scrutiny by the state.

A notable success story of indigenous-NGO relations is demonstrated by the CIDOB in eastern Bolivia. With the help of NGOs, the Izoceno-Guarani and Ayoreo tribes cooperated to develop their own governing organizations (these two peoples had contemplated developing individual political parties, which most likely would have led to greater competition, but not necessarily greater progress).<sup>76</sup> The culmination of this cooperation occurred when their governing body was weaned off of NGOs. Funds and projects that had been awarded to NGOs assisting this body were turned over to the indigenous governing council, and they directly coordinated new projects.

Funding for some NGOs has been intermittent. Bolivia specifically had been the target of European NGOs until the mid-1990s. During the Balkan Wars, Eastern Europe

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<sup>74</sup> Lesley Gill, *Teetering on the Rim: Global Restructuring, Daily Life and the Armed Retreat of the Bolivian State* (New York: Columbia University Press 2000), 139.

<sup>75</sup> Anna Marie Goetz and John Gaventar, "Case Study—Vigilance Committees: Law of Popular Participation, Bolivia" in "Bringing Citizen Voice and Client Focus in Service Delivery (IDS#138), (Brighton, UK: Institute of Development Studies at the University of Sussex 2001), 1-4. [Http://www.ids.ac.uk/ids/govern/citizenvoice/pdfs/lawpopa-bolivia.pdf](http://www.ids.ac.uk/ids/govern/citizenvoice/pdfs/lawpopa-bolivia.pdf). Accessed 2 September 2004.

<sup>76</sup> Silvia Maria Hersch, "The Emergence of Political Organizations among the Guarani Indians of Bolivia and Argentina: A Comparative Perspective," in *Contemporary Indigenous Movements in Latin America*, Erick D. Langer and Elena Munoz, eds. (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources Inc. 2003), 87.

took center stage and diverted NGO resources, aid and foreign investment that had traditionally been earmarked for Bolivia.<sup>77</sup> European NGOs and donors often target their support to the poorest nations in the world. In this case, Bolivia routinely competed with African nations experiencing the direst of conditions, making NGO support sporadic.<sup>78</sup> Finally, even major supporters like the United States change their priorities and reallocate funds accordingly (e.g., support for Plan Colombia). Like other donors, U.S. aid is also conditional; Bolivia's eligibility for aid is tied to counternarcotic efforts. Regardless, the continued presence of NGOs in Bolivia has provided indigenous groups with alternatives to state development programs that have increased the political maneuver space.

#### E. GROUPINGS

Indigenous groups alliances during this period can be described in terms of both internal and external groupings. Some continued to join existing political parties, but others began to develop their own political organizations to ensure that their interests were properly represented. In turn, larger indigenous interest groups began to interact with one another, but they did not coalesce into a single, unified movement.

In western and central Bolivia, instead of joining political parties, these groups also began to create their own. They organized themselves around ethnicity, and then developed politically from this base.<sup>79</sup> During the 1970s, indigenous groups began to split with the Leftist parties with which they had previously been associated. The *Movimiento de la Izquierda Revolucionaria* (Revolutionary Movement of the Left) was created on 1970. The *Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario de Izquierda* (National Revolutionary Movement of the Left) split from the MNR in 1970. Another round of divisions occurred over leadership disputes in the late 1990s. The *Movimiento al Socialismo* (Movement towards Socialism, or MAS) was created from the *Asamblea por*

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<sup>77</sup> Christian Freres, "The European Union as a Global "Civilian Power: Development Cooperation in the EU-Latin America Relations," *Latin American Policy and Society*, vol. 42, no. 2 (Summer 2000), 65. Available from JSTOR. [Http://links.jstor.org/sici?&sici=0022-1937%28200022%2942%3A2%3Cv%3ATEUAAG%3E2.0.CO%3B2-6](http://links.jstor.org/sici?&sici=0022-1937%28200022%2942%3A2%3Cv%3ATEUAAG%3E2.0.CO%3B2-6). Accessed 5 January 2005.

<sup>78</sup> Lesley Gill, *Teetering on the Rim: Global Restructuring, Daily Life and the Armed Retreat of the Bolivian State* (New York: Columbia University Press 2000), 152.

<sup>79</sup> Florencia E. Mallon, "Indian Communities, Political Cultures, and the State in Latin America, 1780-1990," *Journal of Latin American Studies*, vol. 24 (1995), 51. Available from JSTOR. [Http://links.Jstor.org/sici?&sici=0022-216X%2819992%2924%3C35%3AICPCAT%3E2.0.CO%3B2-PY](http://links.Jstor.org/sici?&sici=0022-216X%2819992%2924%3C35%3AICPCAT%3E2.0.CO%3B2-PY). Accessed 5 February 2005.

*la Soberania de los Pueblos* (Assembly for the Peoples Sovereignty), and the *Movimiento sin Miedo* (Movement without Fear) was created from the *Movimiento Bolivia Libre* (Free Bolivia Movement). Internationally, indigenous leaders like Evo Morales began to establish ties with international indigenous rights movements and sympathetic governments.

The following section outlines the mechanisms by which groups attempted to cultivate movements by looking at frames, resource mobilization and repertoires of collective action.

### 1. Frames

In the past, the Spanish conquerors, and later the Bolivian government, attempted to use multiple frames to co-opt the indigenous population. As described in chapters two and three, previous efforts to incorporate this population into a labor-producing class included using existing tribal frames during the days of colonial indirect rule, followed later by client-patron (nobility-peasant) and citizenship frames. Following the 1952 revolution, the government returned to using peasant identity to frame local governance and land ownership issues. However, the peasant frame gained limited traction among the population, which was increasingly framing issues in terms of ethnicity. In the 1990s, the government formally acknowledged the peoples' ethnicity frame.

As indigenous groups competed with one another for dominance, each used different frames to try and build solidarity. During the period when the miners' unions and the state were dependent upon one another, indigenous contention was framed foremost in terms of class struggle. However, this frame did not resonate among the rural indigenous population, which opted not to ally with the miners because they had different preferences. Indigenous frames were not totally absent among miner identity; however, the use of indigenous frames by more militant, radical miners like Filipe Quispe Huanca failed to resonate with rural peasant groups.<sup>80</sup> The fact that the miners' concept of justice differed from that of the rural population further contributed to the failure of mining unions to frame the struggle for the entire indigenous population. Justice for the mining

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<sup>80</sup> Harry Sanabria, "Resistance and the Arts of Domination: Miners and the Bolivian State," *Latin American Perspectives*, vol. 27, no.1 (January 2000), 58. Available from JSTOR. [Http://links.jstor.org/sici=0094-582X%28200001%2927%3A1%3C56%3ARATAOD%3E2.0.CO%3B2-3](http://links.jstor.org/sici=0094-582X%28200001%2927%3A1%3C56%3ARATAOD%3E2.0.CO%3B2-3). Accessed 5 January 2005.

unions was understood mostly in terms of labor laws, while the rural populations' ideas of justice centered on land rights, respect for local governance, and government protection and subsidies for the agricultural sector.

As international demand for Bolivia's natural resources began to wane during this period, the state reduced and marginalized the unions, in favor of developing Bolivia's agricultural sectors. Evidence of this shift can be found in the new frames of Bolivia's indigenous groups. Indigenous contention with the state, now based mostly in the countryside, was now framed in terms of ethnicity, history and justice.

Domestic indigenous frames were reinforced by other regional ethnicity-based social movements throughout the latter half of the 1900s. Ethnicity-framed social movements produced violent insurgent groups, such as the *Movimiento Revolucionario Tupac Amaru* in Peru and the *Tupamaros* in Uruguay. In Ecuador, indigenous groups played a significant role in the January 2000 *coup d'etat*. In Brazil, indigenous groups, with some radical offshoots, developed into the *Movimento dos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem Terra*, or Landless Workers' Movement. These ethnicity frames have been amplified by the proliferation of international human, indigenous, and labor rights organizations.

## **2. Resource Mobilization**

The focus of effort for indigenous resource mobilization was directed mostly towards improving organizational efficiency, coordinating mechanisms, and alliance development among the various indigenous groups. In terms of social movement development, existing structural conditions favored mobilization. First, assembly was not prohibited by the state, so the population could come together in existing communal and public spaces. Indigenous control of the countryside contributed to this. Second, the population was already organized along traditional, communal and trade union lines, so no new structures had to be developed. Rather, the existing structures had only to be modified and directed. Coordination across geographic boundaries was facilitated by the proliferation of communication technologies, specifically cell phones and the internet, in the 1990s.

Indigenous self-reliance also supported the development of social movements. Indigenous dependence on the state was limited, and was further reduced by indigenous ties to non-state actors like NGOs and, to some extent, the underworld via illicit narcotics trafficking.<sup>81</sup> The transactions that describe the quality of these relationships vary. Links with the former resemble a semi-sustained transnational advocacy relationship, whereas links with the latter resemble transnational, temporary political exchange.<sup>82</sup>

### 3. Repertoires

Membership alone is not enough to demonstrate the existence of a social movement. A group may be composed of members whose families share a direct indigenous lineage, but without collective contentious action (in this case, based on ethnic identity), the group is not a social movement. Leites and Wolf explain the difference between preferences and behavior as the supply and demand of opposition.<sup>83</sup> A group may identify itself with a certain cause, exhibiting preferences for change (demand). However, the group does not become a social movement until it begins to organize for the purposes of sustained action, that is to say, to exhibit behavior (supply). The supply side takes inputs and converts them into outputs that are aimed at expanding the movement and producing change. The conversion mechanism, or social movement infrastructure, organizes people and resources, and generates outputs such as peaceful or violent demonstrations, services, publicity, etc. Within social movement theory, these outputs comprise a group's repertoire.

The primary forms of collective action among Bolivia's indigenous groups have been peaceful, but disruptive, demonstrations and blockades. These often begin with marches that originate in rural areas, cover dozens to hundreds of miles, and culminate with the protestors descending on the capital. An example of this was the 1990 "March for Land and Dignity." Over thirty-five days, around 700 demonstrators walked from Trinidad to La Paz (over 400 miles through the rainforest and the Andes) to demand legal

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<sup>81</sup> For more information on organized crime and the Italian Benedetto Santapaoalo Organization in Bolivia, see U.S Department of State International Narcotics Control Strategy Report for 1999. <Http://www.state.gov/g/inl/rls/nrcpt/1999/903.htm>. Accessed 1 March 2004.

<sup>82</sup> Sydney Tarrow, *Power in Movement: Social Movements, Collective Action and Politics*, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 187-188.

<sup>83</sup> Nathan Leites and Charles Wolf, Jr., *Rebellion and Authority: An Analytic Essay on Insurgent Conflicts* (Santa Monica: RAND, 1970): 28-25.

rights to traditional lands. This action gained the support of Quechua and Aymara groups, and resulted in a presidential decree that prevented logging on certain tribal lands in the Beni Department.<sup>84</sup>

These marches and demonstrations typically produce two immediate results. First, because the marches occur over several days, they are sure to catch the attention of both local and international media. Second, because there are only two major routes into La Paz, the marches begin to disrupt traffic and commerce long before the protesters actually reach the capital.

The level of violence exhibited by demonstrators is generally proportional to that exercised by the state, and it is generally limited to rock throwing and some vandalism. The level of violence associated with an event is also a function of time; demonstrations do not begin with violence, but are generally the result of escalating tension towards a tipping point, e.g., when police forces resort to violence to disperse crowds. However, because demonstrations are often scheduled for a specific period, and planned and coordinated among the various groups, protestors often disperse without significant violence.

Deliberate violence was not completely absent from the repertoire. *Cocaleros* in the Chapare conducted violent campaigns when the GOB systemized its forced eradication campaign in the late 1990s. During this period, militant *cocaleros* took up crude arms to ambush *machateros* (eradication forces). They also began to construct crude improvised explosive devices to mine the helicopter landing zones used by the *Rojos Diablos*, the Bolivian Air Force unit tasked with providing air mobility support to the *Fuerzas Especiales para la Lucha Contra Narco-Trafico*, the special counterdrug unit of the Bolivian National Police.<sup>85</sup>

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<sup>84</sup> Five territories were established for six tribes: Mojo, Chimane, Yurakare, Movina, Siriono, and Chacobo.

<sup>85</sup> International Campaign to Ban Landmines, *Landmine Monitor Report 2004: Toward a Mine-Free World* (USA: Human Rights Watch, 2004), 19. [Http://www.icbl.org/lm/2004/print/lm\\_2004execsum.pdf](http://www.icbl.org/lm/2004/print/lm_2004execsum.pdf). Accessed 24 February 2004.

## **F. DECISION-MAKING STRUCTURES**

### **1. State Institutions**

Prior to 1994, access of Bolivia's indigenous population to the national government was mostly limited to the alliances it could form with major political parties like the MNR, and indigenous interests were, at best, limited to local politics where they were the majority. By 2004, indigenous leaders comprised one-third of Bolivia's congressional representatives and nearly two-thirds of Bolivia's municipal mayorships.<sup>86</sup> In rural areas, groups have created self-rule *organizacion democratica rotativa* (rotating democratic organizations).<sup>87</sup> Unlike Western governing systems' prominence of professional politicians, participation in community assemblies is perceived as a local "civic" duty and leadership is shared among heads of household.<sup>88</sup>

### **2. Political Opportunities**

Decision-making structures alone are not significant without political opportunity. While some creations of political maneuver space are obvious, whether or not a political opportunity exists is often only understood *ex post facto*. What makes the exploitation of space even less certain is that three things must occur. First, an opposition group must correctly interpret the situation. Second, it must develop a realistic, feasible plan and marshal the resources to execute it. Third, it must properly execute the plan. Even at this point, success is not guaranteed because the interaction between opposition and majority is both iterative and mutually influencing. Each shape one another's perception of events and courses of action.

Actions can be taken to create political opportunities. However, whether or not proactive measures are successful rests in large part on multiple variables. Social movement and revolutionary theory literature have demonstrated how movements build on one another, and also how they take advantage of existing structures and

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<sup>86</sup> Juan Forero, "Where Incas Ruled, Indians are Hoping for Power," *New York Times*, 17 July 2004, 3.

<sup>87</sup> Xavier Albo and William Carter, *Raices de America: El mundo Aymara* (Madrid: Alianza America/UNESCO, 1998): 477.

<sup>88</sup> Juliana Strobel-Gregor, "Culture and Political Practice of the Aymara and Quechua in Bolivia: Autonomous Forms of Modernity in the Andes," *Latin American Perspectives*, vol. 23, no. 2 (Spring 1996), 78. Available from JSTOR. [Http://links.jstor.org/sici?&sici=0094-582X%28199621%2923%3A2%3C71%3ACAPPOT%3E2.0.CO%3B2-2](http://links.jstor.org/sici?&sici=0094-582X%28199621%2923%3A2%3C71%3ACAPPOT%3E2.0.CO%3B2-2). Accessed 5 February 2005.

relationships.<sup>89</sup> It takes time to generate frames that provide enough resonance to spur action. Furthermore, in the absence of the complete exclusion of political parties, opposition movements are less likely to rebel against the state. Latin America's world-famous historical example of one who failed to understand these dynamics was Ernesto "Che" Guevara. He assumed that he could jump-start revolution in Bolivia, which had its rebellion against colonialism ten years earlier. The oppression frame he attempted to impose failed to resonate with his targeted population; he and his vanguard did not even speak the same language of the population he was attempting to "inspire."

Bolivia's indigenous population took advantage of three types of political opportunities during this period. First, indigenous groups created their own opportunities through mass mobilization aimed at paralyzing transportation within major cities, and along the trans-Bolivia highway. Terrain control was significant because it was a scalable repertoire. Groups could shut down a single city, or the entire country. As mentioned above, indigenous groups also created political opportunity by reducing their dependency on the state.

Second, indigenous groups took advantage of the devolution or shifts of power among elites. Even more so than in the past, elites seeking control of the state could only take control with the tacit approval of Bolivia's rural indigenous population. This was a function of creating a powerful base that could not only oppose other elites, but lower class urban and mining groups, as well.

Third, indigenous groups combined alliance building and bandwagonning to increase their mass and generate greater momentum. Similar interests provided the basis for alliances, but often groups with dissimilar interests or visions came together; this is what Kevin Healy has termed "reciprocal protest-action."<sup>90</sup> Indigenous groups often had various visions of the state and what should be done about it. Groups like the *Movimiento Indígena Pachakuti* (Pachakuti Indigenous Movement) sought a violent

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<sup>89</sup> This is not to say that agents cannot spark "spontaneous" riots. However, these are generally not enduring, and participants tend to exit as the cost of participation increases, e.g., (time away from work/family, threat of prosecution, etc.).

<sup>90</sup> Kevin Healy, "The Political Ascent of Bolivia's Coca Leaf Producers," *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs*, vol. 33, no. 1 (Spring 1991): 98. Available from JSTOR. [Http://links.jstor.org/sici?&sici=0022-1937%2899121%2933%3A1%3C87%3APA0BPC%3E2.0%3B2-Y](http://links.jstor.org/sici?&sici=0022-1937%2899121%2933%3A1%3C87%3APA0BPC%3E2.0%3B2-Y). Accessed 5 February 2005.

revolution. Others, like the *cocaleros* of the MAS party sought changes within the government, while some fought for changes to a specific policy. When larger opposition groups were planning to strike, which could essentially shut the country down for up to a week, other single-issue groups would join the demonstration with the hope of tacking their issues onto the major grievances.

## G. OUTCOMES

Revision to Bolivia's constitution in 1994 declared the republic to be "multiethnic" and "pluricultural."<sup>91</sup> In accordance with the Law of Popular Participation (or law of decentralization), the state formally recognized peasant authority through the legal creation of the territorial base organizations and the *sindicatos campesino*, and it extended the authority of municipalities. These grassroots organizations were also given the authority to provide budget oversight for municipal government developmental programs.<sup>92</sup>

The Agrarian Reform Law of 1994 amended the 1953 version of the law. The purpose behind the 1953 law was to try to incorporate rural indigenous peoples into the state by granting communal lands to them as peasants. The new law specifically acknowledged the ownership of communal lands by indigenous groups.<sup>93</sup> Thus, land ownership based on class identification now became land ownership based on indigenous identity.

Between 2002 and 2003, President Sanchez de Lozada undertook reforms to privatize Bolivia's natural gas industry and export it through Chile. This met with rampant protest from indigenous groups along a number of lines. First, groups preferred to nationalize the industry; the tax structure aimed at encouraging foreign direct investment that had been established as part of the 1985 shock therapy had produced little actual income for Bolivia. Returns from taxes on foreign companies were, at the most, eighteen percent, which is one of the lowest rates in the world.

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<sup>91</sup> *Constitucion Politica de Bolivia 1967, Texto Reformada de 1995*, art. 1, sec. 2.

<sup>92</sup> J. Montgomery Roper, "Bolivian Legal Reforms and Local Indigenous Organizations: Opportunities and Obstacles in a Lowland Municipality," *Latin American Perspectives*, vol. 28, no. 1 (January 2003), 142. [Http://lap.sagepub.com/cgi/reprint/30/1/139](http://lap.sagepub.com/cgi/reprint/30/1/139). Accessed 5 January 2005.

<sup>93</sup> *Ibid.*,143.

Second, opposition groups detested the idea of exporting natural gas through Chile. Bolivia's loss of its coastal territory to Chile in 1880 as a result of the War of the Pacific served as a rallying cry for nationalism. This is significant because it is one of the few times that indigenous groups actually identified themselves as Bolivians. Third, the events served as catalyst for a host of other demands that were thrown into the mix. These included demands for social reformation, expansion of state services, and even a reversion to a pre-sixteenth century Aymara Kingdom (*Kallasayu*).<sup>94</sup>

The eleven months of Goni's second presidency were marred by riots, strikes, and resulted in eighty deaths. At one point, the *Grupo Especial de Seguridad*, the Bolivian National Police's anti-riot and anti-terrorist unit, mutinied. Several countries offered to mediate the dispute, or to provide alternate access routes for Bolivia's natural gas to the sea.<sup>95</sup> Goni requested financial support from the United States in order to improve his ability to make concessions to protestors' demands, but was answered only with moral support. The tipping point came in October 2003. Amidst increasing violence and unrest, Goni resigned.<sup>96</sup>

Vice President Carlos Mesa was elevated to the presidency with the approval of congress and made three immediate concessions to diffuse the standoff. First, he agreed to hold a referendum on the future of Bolivia's natural gas industry to determine whether or not it should be nationalized, to create new legislation that captured greater revenues from foreign controlled corporations, and to decide whether or not to construct a natural gas liquification plant within Bolivia to increase its export value.

Second, he agreed to take steps towards the creation of a constituent assembly in 2006 to increase congressional representation of indigenous peoples. Third, he agreed to postpone coca eradication in the Chapare while it was being surveyed to determine how

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<sup>94</sup> Speech by Filipe Quispe titled "Oppressed, but not Defeated." Erick D. Langer and Elena Munoz, eds., *Contemporary Indigenous Movements in Latin America* (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources Inc., 2003), 205.

<sup>95</sup> Peru and Uruguay offered to construct pipelines through their territory. Peru's offer was conditioned with the understanding that the liquification plant would be constructed in Peru.

<sup>96</sup> Brazil and Argentina sent envoys who offered to mediate between the conflicting groups. Given the rapid resignation that soon followed, and because several trade agreements hinge upon the prerequisite of democratic state institutions, the attempt at mediation may have also been a signal that it was more important for Bolivia's democracy to remain intact than for Goni to continue his term as president.

much of the land could be used for legal cultivation. The original plan had been to conduct the survey and eradication simultaneously.

## H. NETWORKS

During this period, Bolivia's indigenous groups displayed all of the characteristics of Hine's and Gerlach's definition of a networked organization. The indigenous social movements were segmented, polycephalous, and networked.<sup>97</sup>

The movements were segmented, exhibiting diverse membership in terms of location, professional association, and class. Despite differences in the exact meaning of indigenous rights, the indigenous frame resonated across most boundaries and provided enough common ground for working through the government for change, as well as for mobilizing collective action against the state.

The polycephalous nature of the movements was demonstrated by two factors. First was the creation of multiple indigenous social organizations, especially in the east. Despite the emergence of large indigenous organizations such as *Confederacion Indigena del Oriente Boliviano* (CIDOB) and new political parties (MAS, MNRI, etc.), their membership base was not homogenous. Rather, these large groups really served as umbrella organizations composed of numerous local indigenous/peasant groups, and no single group spoke for all peoples. Second, membership in multiple societies or associations (trade, political, community, etc.) also contributed to distributed leadership.

Bolivia's indigenous movement was networked in several ways (see Figure 4). Domestically, the ethnic frame resonated across many identities, which helped it to permeate the entire spectrum of Bolivia's classes. Connectivity was expanded by the number of people who exhibited multiple identities or membership, e.g., ethnicity, profession, religious, regional, tribal, etc. In some areas such as El Alto, mass, proximity and homogeneity mutually reinforced the ethnicity frame, which made it extremely difficult for La Paz to control, especially from two thousand feet below. This connectivity was reinforced by links with non-governmental organizations, regional and international third-state actors, and international organizations.

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<sup>97</sup> Luther P. Gerlach and Virginia H. Hine, "The Structure of Social Movements: Environmental Activism and its Opponents," John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, eds., *Networks and Netwars* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2001), 289-290, 299.

Regionally, leaders within of Bolivia's indigenous movements established substantial links that amplified the voice of the movements and provided them with greater legitimacy. Evo Morales skillfully developed relationships with government and international community leaders in the Andean region where he has been officially received on several occasions. Morales has also established relationships with Presidents Hugo Chavez and Fidel Castro, ensuring that his support is not limited to neoliberal Western democracies.

Beyond Latin America, Morales has cultivated sympathy through membership in international indigenous movement organizations. He has been received in multiple countries, including Switzerland, Japan and Libya.

## I. CONCLUSION

By 2004, Bolivia's indigenous groups had developed unprecedented political and social power. They also possessed the ability to deliberately disrupt Bolivia's economy by closing down transportation routes and by making Bolivia less attractive to foreign investors. Although they did not occupy the highest government posts, the state could, in fact, do little without at least the tacit approval of the indigenous organizations. Bolivia's




Figure 4. Contemporary Indigenous Networks (2005)

indigenous groups achieved this through a combination of recognized and self-generated political opportunities, by developing frames that legitimated common and dissimilar interests, and by taking advantage of existing social structures and spaces to mobilize collective action. These actions helped increase the quality and quantity of linkages among the various indigenous groups, as well as expanded their linkages with international organizations and third-state actors. These networks were reinforced by the gradual infiltration of Bolivia's peoples into state government.

The relative autonomy of Bolivia's indigenous groups signals a clear power shift away from the state. Power in Bolivia is now split between the indigenous groups and the Santa Cruz economic hub. This shift to the east has even inspired some businessmen to call for autonomy of Bolivia's crescent.

Despite the increase of indigenous power, this is not to suggest that Bolivia's indigenous movements are unified. Preference differences still exist based on local interests (urban or rural) and competing views of modernization, representation, local governance, land use and government protection of markets. These differences fuel suspicion among the groups and prevent complete unification, except in the direst of circumstances. These differences also provide political opportunities for other groups, such as Bolivia's eastern business sector and the military, to take advantage of in the pursuit of their own interests.

## V. CONCLUSION

### A. INTRODUCTION

This thesis has described the mechanisms that have led to the recent rise of indigenous power in Bolivia. As has been demonstrated, this phenomenon was not simply the result of indigenous groups allying with elite opposition. Nor was it just a case of indigenous mass finally overpowering an elite minority. The story of the ascendancy of Bolivia's indigenous groups was, in fact, the product of both structure (opportunities and constraints determined by the environment) and strategy (the reciprocal interaction of the various actors).

This chapter reviews the theoretical framework used to explain the rise of indigenous power. It is followed by a review of the major themes of each chapter and the major findings of this study. It concludes with recommendations for further study of competition for power in Bolivia.

### B. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The theoretical framework used to explain the ascendancy of Bolivia's indigenous groups began with political economy methodology and was reinforced by an emphasis on the organization and connectivity of the various actors. This framework was helpful to demonstrate sources of strength and the expansion of indigenous networks. However, this framework was unable to get at the heart of how indigenous groups mobilized and developed into a significant force. A purely structural argument is not sufficient because it can reasonably be argued that the conditions were always ripe for indigenous groups to come to power. If this was in fact the case, a structural argument is unable to explain why indigenous groups did not come to power sooner. At the opposite end of the spectrum, a pure agency argument would submit that the right leaders with the right ideas had not come along until recently, e.g., Evo Morales or Filipe Quispe Huancó. However, charismatic indigenous leaders and ideas of autonomy have certainly existed throughout Bolivia's history.

To fill this gap, this thesis turned to social movement theory (SMT). By examining the images used by groups to frame issues, cultivate the faithful and appeal to the uncertain; the political spaces used to organize groups and coordinate actions; the

identification and creation of political opportunities by indigenous groups; and the examination of repertoires, a greater level of fidelity on just what forces were at work was able to be achieved. For example, SMT helped to explain why ethnicity frames obtained with some tribes, but not others. It also helped to distinguish between the stated aims of groups and their true interests.

### C. CHAPTER SUMMARY

As described in the second chapter, the period from the 1700s through 1879 can be classified as a period of waxing and waning power for the indigenous populations. However, the state was never able to gain control of the population, either through inclusion or exclusion. While the indigenous groups possessed no economic power compared to the Spanish or Bolivian elite, this did not prevent the indigenous population from adapting and functioning under their rulers. During this period, indigenous groups achieved little international voice and had yet to establish significant links outside of Bolivia. Missionaries and the Church were early linkages that began to connect ethnic populations to non-state actors and gave them voice outside their borders.

Intra-ethnic linkages during this period were strong, and communities remained organized along traditional, hierarchical lines. Indigenous power was diffused through the different alliances made by community leaders. The *caciques* did not share the same affinities; some allied with the Spanish government or the Church, some with *criollos*, and some with other tribes. In southeastern Bolivia, the nomadic tribes preferred to be left to themselves.

Chapter III demonstrated that the foundation had been laid for indigenous groups to emerge as significant political and social movements. First, structure limited the strategies that both the state and indigenous groups pursued. The state generally retained control of the urban areas while indigenous groups retained control of the countryside. Each could pose a challenge on the others' terrain, but their capacity to do so for a sustained period was limited. These limited incursions created political space for indigenous groups to organize. However, indigenous groups were still not unified. Mining/urban movements and rural indigenous groups developed along separate trajectories based on local structure and interests.

Indigenous networks during this period began to coalesce around two hubs: urban/miner and rural. Both developed ties with the political Left, but the formers' linkages were arguably stronger based on proximity to elite power centers and because the state mining industry was dependent on its mining labor force. Because rural indigenous groups were more removed from the state, they were able to strengthen internal community linkages. These relationships formed the base for their ascendancy in the twentieth century.

Chapter IV incorporated social movement theory to increase the resolution of how indigenous groups actually moved from interests groups into a social movement that exhibited contentious behavior. Competition among the various groups to frame their issues and assume leadership included class, ethnic similarity, ethnic divergence, and religion/tradition. Furthermore, these groups organized along a variety of lines that did not always lend themselves to coalition building, e.g., Western political party, trade and labor unions, ethnic groups, Traditional Community Organizations, etc. Ultimately, the indigenous frame had multiple meanings among the groups and was not solely a unifying frame. Instead, it was reinforced with an injustice frame that could easily be tied into almost every grievance.

During this period, networks among Bolivia's three major indigenous movements strengthened, as did linkages to external actors. Linkages to other countries and international interest organizations provided indigenous movements with voice and resources on an unprecedented level. Relationships with Venezuela and Cuba, and emerging relationships with Brazil have increased the diversity of support systems available to indigenous groups, which allows them to absorb shocks from other international actors such as the United States.

#### **D. FINDINGS**

This research has led to five findings based on the evidence presented. First, ethnicity alone is a generally weak frame given the various interests and forms of organization among the tribes and classes within Bolivia. A more accurate way to describe ethnicity-based opposition in Bolivia is not as an indigenous movement, but as indigenous movements capable of coalescing from time to time.

Second, the gradual inclusion of indigenous groups by the state, reinforced by the introduction of NGOs and the expansion of indigenous ties to regional and international groups, most likely prevented the radicalization of the movement. However, this also made the indigenous population less reliant on the state and reduced indigenous norms for toleration of perceived state injustices.

Third, with respect to organization and networks, prior to the arrival of the Spanish, significant hierarchical and community networks existed among the various indigenous tribes and classes. The limited ability of indigenous groups to connect with one another was a factor of both Spanish (and later state) influence and geography. However, even despite this influence, intra-community networks were strengthened in areas where the state had little penetration. This strengthening laid the groundwork for indigenous groups to begin to connect as development and technology helped the population surmount the challenges of geography and remoteness.

The significance of geography in this process cannot be overstated. While it initially proved to be a barrier to indigenous connectivity, it transformed into one of the major features of contentious action. The ability of indigenous groups to isolate specific cities within Bolivia, or the entire country, was an indispensable, scalable tool that these groups could use to counter the physical coercive capacity of the state. The GOB may have the legitimate monopoly on the use of force within its borders, but it fails to be a credible deterrent if it cannot be applied at any time throughout the state.

Fourth, while indigenous groups did ally with elite opposition groups, this was not solely causal. Indigenous groups were often in a position to make significant demands on elites and used structure to their advantage (e.g., indigenous challenges to *hacendados* using Spanish law, the use of urban control to make demands upon elites, ignoring elites when new resource opportunities become available, etc.).

Finally, it is not possible for indigenous groups to recreate a pre-colonial state. However, indigenous groups are rebuilding Bolivia from the inside moving outwards, because they have begun at the grassroots level.

## **E. RECOMMENDATIONS**

In order to evaluate interest groups and networks, both strategic political assessments and tactical pre-deployment site surveys should consider:

- Mobilization Spaces and Resources
- Frames
- Political Opportunities

As has been demonstrated, a large portion of social mobilization in Bolivia occurs outside of official political structures. Understanding networks in Bolivia and where power is located requires a higher degree of fidelity at lower levels of society.

Figure 5. Assessment Considerations

### **1. Strategic Level Policymakers**

While Bolivia may continue to be described as a weak state, the same cannot be said for its societies. Orders may be published in La Paz, but they will continue to be issued from east of the Andes Mountains. Future competition for control in Bolivia will continue between the eastern business sector and the indigenous groups. Bolivia's structural conditions (struggling economy, limited infrastructure, etc.) will limit the courses of action available to the groups competing for power.

The need to improve the economy while expanding social welfare ensures that economic nationalization, coca, natural gas extraction and free-trade agreements will continue to be contentious issues. However, the ability of the United States to influence these issues may become increasingly limited as Bolivia's interest groups develop ties that diminish the significance of U.S. aid. U.S. foreign policy will require a more sophisticated approach. How well the U.S. understands Bolivia's actors and their networks will be critical to crafting precise, discriminate foreign policy.

What is certain is that eastern business's freedom of action will be increasingly subject to the interests of indigenous groups. Santa Cruz is just as vulnerable as La Paz

and Cochabamba to blockades, and the region's natural gas and oil fields also remain vulnerable to interference and disruption by domestic groups.

Finally, structural arguments may identify the conditions that favor the development of social movements, but a greater level of fidelity is necessary if one is to predict their potential and trajectories. Organization and social movement theories provide a solid framework for this level of analysis.

## **2. Tactical Level**

This thesis has demonstrated that Bolivia is not a strong nation-state in the traditional sense. Rather, it is a constellation of ecosystems and subsystems, and each system is different. Working in and among a local population requires the development of local knowledge, and an understanding that this knowledge varies among each community. For those operating at the tactical level, four points are significant.

First, for the indigenous population, military service is a double-edged sword. The bonds formed between the lower classes within the military and the Left during the Chaco War do not exist. One year of conscripted service is still levied on Bolivia's young men, the majority of which come from Bolivia's indigenous population. Although allegiance to the state (and its military) is mixed at best, military service in and of itself is seen as an honorable endeavor. Within many indigenous communities, a certificate of military service is the gateway to future employment, and it increases ones social standing within the community.

Second, United States and European-based NGOs permeate Bolivia, and they have achieved mixed results. Some have improved communities' abilities to organize and develop infrastructure well beyond what the state could have provided. Others have had less impressive results. When operating among indigenous populations, it is paramount to not only know which NGOs are operating within an area, but also to understand their historical relationship with the population. Some NGOs have established significant credibility in some communities, and their cooperation or tacit approval *per se* may help reduce the friction between a population and the military. Becoming associated with NGOs with poor reputations will only add friction to military operations.

Third, many government agencies operate on long-term plans. While success or major improvement to quality of life is always predicted somewhere in the future, little actually happens in the present. Tactical level operators should take note of this and endeavor to find out what type of projects they can undertake that will have immediate effects. Immediate results are tangible

Finally, as communication technology proliferates and transportation infrastructure improves, indigenous groups have increasing access to information and resources. These links include relationships with other legal and illicit nodes. Understanding specifically how a population ties into or associates with others, and from where it obtains its resources, is critical in developing efficient strategies for counterinsurgency, stability and humanitarian operations.

#### **F. CONCLUSION**

Several explanations have been given for the ascendancy of Bolivia's indigenous groups. Structural arguments identify the conditions under which movements have developed, but they fail to explain why some groups are successful and others are not. Agency arguments fail to explain why Bolivia's previous indigenous leaders were unable to achieve the same level of success, or why earlier frames of ethnicity did not obtain.

This thesis has demonstrated that the rise of indigenous power in Bolivia can be understood best by examining the organizational structure of these movements, and by applying social movement theory to help explain why some groups have been successful and others have not.

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Camp Pendleton, California
7. Dag Hammarskjöld Library of the United Nations  
United Nations  
Room L- 327  
New York, NY